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This thesis consists of three papers on the economics and structure of 
Swedish families. 
 
Paper [I] examines the determinants of children’s educational achieve-
ment in Sweden. Special attention is given to the labour market work by 
mothers and fathers in terms of its influence on the educational outcome 
of their children, measured as grade point average (GPA) in compulsory 
as well as upper secondary school. The results show that there is a posi-
tive relationship between parental income and GPA. Regarding the 
number of hours worked in the labour market, the results differ between 
mothers and fathers. Having a mother that works less than full time has 
positive effects on the child’s grades throughout the schooling of the 
child, whereas significant effects of the hours of work that the father 
puts in are found during upper secondary school only.  
 
Paper [II] explores the role of financial surprises and match quality in 
the dissolution of relationships. The analysis is carried out both for sur-
prises in the short term earnings and surprises in the long-run earnings 
capacity. It is found that positive surprises in short term earnings have a 
destabilizing effect for a relationship. Generally, a negative surprise in 
long-run earnings capacity for males has a destabilizing effect. How-
ever, if it is combined with a female positive surprise, the effect is stabi-
lizing. Commitments become more stable the older the spouses are at 
the start, and if young children are present. 
 
Paper [III] studies the role of unemployment in the dissolution of rela-
tionships by applying a two-step estimation method to an extensive data 
set, which contains information about young Swedish males and fe-
males. Unemployment is recognized as endogenous in the separation 
decision, and the results show that the effect of unemployment on sepa-
ration is biased when unemployment is assumed to be exogenous in the 
separation equation. The probability of separation is found to be increas-
ing with male unemployment, while female unemployment decreases 
the probability of dissolution. 
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Swedish society has changed over the past four decades. As in the rest 
of Western Europe, the society of today is characterized by a high de-
gree of specialization, which has made it possible to go to the market 
and purchase virtually whatever you need instead of producing it at 
home. In addition, the production that still takes place at home is typi-
cally more efficient, meaning that less time is spent in household pro-
duction than before. Women have entered the labour markets and are as 
educated as men, and there are well-developed public child care sys-
tems. These developments have most likely affected the conditions un-
der which (potential) partners make their choices and may, therefore, in-
fluence their decisions of whether to enter or to exit a relationship. Fur-
thermore, the reallocation of resources and time within the household 
may have had an influence on the opportunities and behaviour of the 
children.  
  
In Sweden, the number of marriages has decreased since the mid 1960’s, 
as can be seen in Figure 1 below. The extreme exception was 1989 when 
a change in the widow-pension-law was announced. Figure 1 also shows 
that the number of divorces has increased over the past forty years. The 
peak in 1974 was a consequence of a change in the divorce-law. 
 
Figure 1. Divorce and Marriage Patterns in Sweden 
Number of Marriages and Divorces 





















Note: Data from Statistics Sweden: database, Population and Population Changes 1749- 
2006. 
 
At the same time as the number of marriages has decreased, another 
form of togetherness has become more common in Sweden. Today, it is 
more a rule than an exception to cohabit prior to marriage; in fact, many 
couples never get married at all, but continue their civil status as cohabi-Introduction and Summary 
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tants. This trend has resulted in an increase in the number of out of wed-
lock births, and being born out of wedlock is no longer socially unac-
ceptable. In 2005, as can be seen in Table 1 below, about one third of 
the children in Sweden were living with parents who were not married. 
Worth mentioning is that children living with parents that are not mar-
ried are about twice as likely to be subjected to their parents separating 
than children whose parents are married. 
 
Table 1. Share of Parents Living Together and their Civil Status, chil-
dren 0-19 years old  
 
Year 
Share of Parents 
Living Together 
Married of those 
Living Together 
Cohabiting of those 
Living Together 
1991  84 83 17 
1996  81 78 22 
2000  77 75 25 
2002  77 73 27 
2004  78 71 29 
2005  78 69 31 
 
Note: From Statistics Sweden, Barn och deras familjer 2005. 
 
Unilateral divorce and the possibility to leave an unsatisfactory relation-
ship may be good for the adults involved, but it may have negative ef-
fects on the school performance and labour market outcomes of their 
children (e.g. Keith and Finlay, 1988, Gruber 2004). The fact that about 
25 percent of Swedish born seventeen-year-olds have lived through a 
separation alone highlights the need for more research on why people 
decide to separate.  
 
The role played by economic factors in separation decisions has so far 
largely been neglected in Sweden. Several interesting questions remain 
unanswered. Do unexpected changes in income have an impact on the 
probability of separation? Does unemployment of one spouse increase 
the probability of divorce? Is the effect of unemployment different de-
pending on whether the unemployment is experienced by a man or a 
woman? Such factors have been found to be important in separation stu-
dies relating to other countries, for example in Aassve (2001) and Bur-
gess et al. (2003), both using American data, and in Hansen (2005) using 
Norwegian data.  
 
In economics, a child is sometimes considered as a household public 
good for its parents. Therefore, parents’ reallocation of time between 
household and market work, as well as the fact that separation is more 
frequent now than it used to be, may have changed their contribution 
towards this public good. How these changes affect the well-being of Introduction and Summary 
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children is well worth studying. For instance, the greater participation in 
market work by mothers could, if the alternative child carer is not as 
good as the mother in providing for the child’s needs, affect the child’s 
well-being. In addition, the increased time spent in labour market pro-
duction by mothers may also change the father’s role in contributing to 
the child’s well-being. It is quite possible that the role of the father as a 
child carer has become more important as mothers are spending more 
time away from home.  
 
This thesis consists of three papers all connected to the economics of the 
family. The first paper concerns the effect of market work by parents on 
the educational achievements by their children. The two following pa-
pers deal with economic explanations for separation, with special focus 
on the role of unexpected events. 
 
The reminder of the introduction is outlined as follows. Section 2 ex-
plains the economic incentives to engage in a relationship. Section 3 
gives a short theoretical and empirical background to labour division 
within a couple and its consequences for the children involved. Section 
4 gives a theoretical background to the economics of divorce and pre-
sents some previous empirical findings. Section 5 summarizes the three 
papers of the thesis. 
 
2 Why  Marry? 
 
To most of us, marriage is believed to be connected to love. Love is cer-
tainly a good reason to get married, and a good ground for a lasting rela-
tionship. Love is likely to reduce the magnitude of any conflicts of inter-
est that may arise in the relationship. If happiness of one’s spouse is a 
determinant of one’s own happiness, spouses who love each other share 
a common interest in keeping each other happy. 
 
Although love is a good reason to get married, it might not be the only 
reason. Within economics, there are also assumed to be other, more tan-
gible, reasons as to why it should be preferable for a person to live in a 
union rather than living alone. For example, living in a union allows for 
economies of scale, efficient public good provision for the union as a 
whole, risk sharing, coordination of investments, and division and spe-
cialization of labour, even though the need for the latter might be less 
obvious nowadays. 
 
Within economics, the idea is that people get married when the expected 
utility from being married (where love is included) exceeds the expected 
utility from remaining single. The theory explaining this phenomenon Introduction and Summary 
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assumes that the utility obtained by an individual from being in a rela-
tionship depends on his or her own characteristics, the characteristics of 
the partner and the quality of the commitment match. The individual 
also obtains utility from commitment-specific capital that is accumu-
lated during the relationship; for instance, relationships with mutual fri-
ends and the quality and quantity of children. In addition, the utility for 
an individual of being in a relationship naturally also depends on how 
the resources are allocated between spouses. 
 
3  Division of Labour and the Child as a Public Good 
 
The economic view of how the resource allocation decision within the 
marriage is carried out, once a couple has tied the knot, has changed 
over time. The traditional approach to studying the household supply 
and demand decision has been that the household maximizes a single 
utility function (see, for example, Samuelson, 1956, and Becker, 1974). 
The division of labour within the household, as well as between the 
household and the market, was determined by relative marginal produc-
tivities, and comparative advantage was the ground for an effective out-
come.  
 
The view of the family as one single decision unit emerged during a 
time when the husband was considered to be the breadwinner. Since 
then women have entered the labour market, and are as highly educated 
as males, which is one reason as to why the view of decision making has 
been modified. The newer, and nowadays more realistic, view of re-
source allocation within the family is based on the theory of bargaining, 
which recognizes that households may not behave as a single decision 




Weiss and Willis (1985) were among the first to introduce the well-
being of children as a household public good that enters the utility func-
tions of the parents. One of the most widely used proxies for measuring 
the well-being of children is their performance in school. The spouses 
are not necessarily equally productive in providing the proper care the 
child needs to succeed in school, and the outcome will therefore be de-
termined both by the time allocated to childcare, in terms of providing 
help with homework etc., and their productivity, which depends on, for 
instance, their own education. The educational achievement is also like-
ly to depend on the productivity of the school attended by the child. 
                                                 
1 See Bergstrom (1997) for a review on how economists’ view of decision-making within 




Many theories and hypotheses have been developed in the quest of try-
ing to explain why some children succeed in life while others do not. 
One of the hypotheses that has gained a great deal of attention in previ-
ous research, focusing on the allocation of time between market and 
non-market work, is the “working mother hypothesis” (see, for example, 
Haveman et al. 1991). Labour force participation by mothers is said to 
have two offsetting effects on the school outcomes of a child. The 
mother working and contributing to family income may have a positive 
effect on the child’s future success, since higher family income could 
guarantee participation in better schools, living in better neighbourhoods 
or participation in extracurricular activities that are otherwise too expen-
sive. At the same time, the mother’s absence from home may have a ne-
gative impact on the child’s development, for instance, if the alternative 
care giver is not as good at providing for the child’s needs as the mother. 
The working mother hypothesis was developed during a time period 
when the mother was still considered to be the prime care giver in many 
senses. Nowadays it is not as obvious that only the labour market activi-
ties by mothers should be of importance for the educational achieve-
ments of the child. The father’s hours of work could be equally impor-
tant. 
 
Paper [I] of this thesis studies the determinants of children’s educational 
achievement with special focus on the effect of market work by both pa-
rents.  
 
3.1  Empirical Evidence on Parental Work and Child Success  
When it comes to testing for the influence of parental work on children’s 
educational achievement, there is no evidence that the father’s work is 
of any importance, as long as he works. In fact, none of the previous 
studies has utilized extensive data on the father’s hours of work. When it 
comes to testing for the influence of the mother’s work on children’s 
educational achievement, the results are inconclusive. 
 
Stafford (1987) analyses the relationship between family resources, mar-
ket work by mothers, fertility, child spacing, and the grades reported by 
teachers. Using a sample of 77 American children, he finds a significant 
and negative effect of the mother’s market work on the teacher’s ratings 
of the child, and recognizes that there is a trade off between market 
work and household work, which is in line with the “absent from home” 
part of the working mother hypothesis. Total family income is found to 
have a positive significant effect on teacher’s ratings, but the mother’s 
wage rate only has weak effects. 
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Haveman et al. (1991) estimate the effects of a variety of socioeconomic 
circumstances on children’s performance in school, measured as high 
school completion. Using a sample of 1 300 American children, the au-
thors find a positive relationship between market work by mothers and 
the child’s high school completion, but they are not able to separate be-
tween the number of years the mother worked and the income she con-
tributed to the family. The mother working, and thereby contributing to 
family income, has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
high school completion, if she works while the child is twelve to fifteen 
years old. The influence is smaller when the child is younger. The re-
sults found in this study are interpreted as contradicting the “absent from 
home” aspect of the working mother hypothesis and the authors argue 
that the positive effect of the mother contributing additional resources 
while working dominates the negative effect of her being absent from 
home. 
 
Ermisch and Francesconi (2002) focus on the relationship between par-
ents’ employment during the first five years of a child’s life and the sub-
sequent educational achievement, measured as achievement of an “Ad-
vanced-level” qualification as a young adult. They are among the first to 
include any measure of the father’s hours of work. For a sample of yo-
ung British adults, they find a negative impact on the child’s educational 
attainment if the mother worked full-time when the child was young. 
Part-time work by mothers had a less distinguished negative effect. For 
fathers, the authors distinguish between employment and unemployment 
and they find that, given income, the effect of employment is negative, 
although not always significant. Higher full family income increases the 
children’s educational attainment, but given full income, higher wage ra-
tes have negative impacts.  
 
Öster (2006) studies the effect of parental unemployment on children’s 
performance in school. She uses a longitudinal sample of 35 550 Swed-
ish upper secondary school graduates and studies whether the children 
move over GPA percentiles with parental unemployment. The findings 
are that children who are subjected to maternal unemployment during 
upper secondary school slightly improve their grades. Paternal short-
term unemployment has a negative effect on the child’s grade, while no 
significant effect is found by long-term unemployment. This is inter-
preted as the shock of the unemployment wearing out with time.  
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Studies concerning children’s well-being are numerous
2, while those ex-
plicitly focusing on market work by parents and children’s educational 
achievements are more scarce. The role of fathers’ market work is to a 
large extent a neglected area, even though it is not clear that only the 
hours of work by mothers should be of any importance. 
 
4 Why  Divorce? 
 
The economic theory of divorce is the opposite side of the economic 
theory of marriage and, therefore, the reason for divorce is explained as 
the opposite of the reasons for marriage. Thus, divorce occurs whenever 
the expected utility from remaining married falls below the expected uti-
lity from living as a single person. The pioneering article in the eco-
nomic theory of divorce is Becker et al. (1977). It recognizes two rea-
sons for divorce: the first is related to the quality of match, and the sec-
ond to uncertainty about partner characteristics and future utility from 
the relationship.  
 
Quality of match refers to how well your characteristics fit together with 
the characteristics of the partner you choose. As a result of this reason-
ing, search theory plays a substantial role. If the search for a partner is 
assumed to be costly, people will tend to search for a shorter period of 
time, which may reduce the quality of the match. Moreover, since meet-
ings occur randomly, a marriage that is initially acceptable can become 
unacceptable, as a result of finding a better match. What you search for 
in a partner might differ between different types of societies, and in any 
given society it might evolve over time. In a society characterized by the 
more traditional division of labour, with the male as the sole breadwin-
ner, so-called negative assortative mating might be dominating. In a so-
ciety characterized by a more equal division of labour, such as Sweden 
today, positive assortative mating instead dominates. Negative assorta-
tive mating means that people seek somebody to complement the char-
acteristics they possess to allow for the use of competitive advantages. 
Positive assortative mating, on the other hand, means that people are 
looking for their equal in terms of personal characteristics, such as age, 
education and income.  
 
When you meet someone, certain characteristics are directly observable 
while others are not. This means that the decision to engage in a com-
mitted relationship will partly be based on the characteristics that are ob-
                                                 
2 There are, for instance, many studies relating to drug abuse and the sexual behaviour of 
youths (e.g. Rashad and Kaestner , 2004), to children and poverty (e.g. Jolliffe et al., 2005) 
and to children and family structure (e.g. Winkelmann, 2006). Introduction and Summary 
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servable and partly on the predictions you can make about unobservable 
characteristics. Hence, the decision will be associated with some degree 
of risk of disappointment, and new information or unexpected events 
can change the expected gains from staying in the relationship. Exam-
ples of unexpected events are changes in income, changes in money 
transfers or unemployment. This is, so far, the least explored part of the 
Becker et al. theory, although some empirical research exists.  
 
Papers [II] and [III] of this thesis are concerned with the role of unex-
pected events for the probability of dissolution. Paper [II] focuses on the 
role of unexpected changes in short-run earnings and long-run earnings 
capacity, respectively, while Paper [III] instead studies the role of un-
employment.  
 
4.1  Empirical Evidence of the Role of Financial Surprises  
Neither the theory, nor the existing empirical evidence gives any clear-
cut answers as to how unexpected events will influence the risk of disso-
lution. For example, as long as there is some degree of income pooling, 
an unexpected increase in the earnings capacity of one spouse increases 
the value of the commitment for the other person, which would work 
towards a more stable commitment. At the same time, a higher earnings 
capacity increases the utility of being single, and increases the probabil-
ity of meeting a match of higher quality that accepts you, which will, in 
turn, decrease the stability of the commitment.  
 
Hoffman and Duncan (1995) study the role of changes in money trans-
fers for the divorce rate among a sample of 1 098 American couples. 
They find that increases in AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children) benefits slightly increase the probability of dissolution, while 
increases in the husband’s earnings and the wife’s wage rate slightly re-
duce the probability of divorce.  
 
Weiss and Willis (1997) study the relationship between divorce and un-
anticipated changes in economic circumstances. Using a sample of 7 588 
young Americans, they predict the long-run earnings capacity and ana-
lyse if differences between the predicted and observed value of earnings 
capacity affect the probability of divorce. They find that an unexpected 
increase in the husband’s earnings capacity reduces the probability of 
divorce, while an unexpected increase in the wife’s earning capacity 
tends to increase the probability of divorce.  
 
Svarer (2005) instead predicts short-run earnings and analyses if devia-
tions between observed and predicted values have an impact on the di-
vorce hazard. The sample consists of 10 822 married Danish couples, Introduction and Summary 
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and the results show that short-run deviations between expected and ob-
served earnings do affect the risk of divorce in a way that is asymmetric 
between men and women. For women, deviations in either direction in-
creased the divorce hazard while for men, positive deviations stabilize 
and negative deviations destabilize the marriage.  
 
Others who focus on the role of income and unexpected changes in eco-
nomic circumstances include Aassve (2001), Burgess et al. (2003), Bö-
heim and Ermisch (2001), and Walker and Zhu (2006). 
 
4.2  Empirical Evidence of the Role of Unemployment 
Besides changes in income or changes in money transfers, unemploy-
ment can also be regarded as an unexpected event since it may be hard 
to foresee. Unemployment can stress the relationship in different ways. 
For example, unemployment will often lead to financial stress which 
may reduce the partner’s expected utility of staying in the relationship. 
Besides the monetary factors associated with unemployment, unem-
ployment may lead to the perception of moral failure, either for the un-
employed or for the spouse. In addition, unemployment is often con-
nected to a deterioration in both psychological and physical well-being 
that can reduce the expected gains from staying in the relationship.
3 
 
As previously discussed, the results regarding unexpected changes in in-
come or money transfers have been found to be asymmetric between 
males and females. When it comes to unemployment, the findings are 
once more different depending on gender. Jensen and Smith (1990) ana-
lyse a panel of 3 000 Danish couples and find male unemployment to 
have a positive and significant effect on the divorce risk, while there is 
no significant effect of female unemployment. This study was conducted 
some years ago and it is possible that female unemployment would play 
a more substantial role nowadays. However, similar results are found by 
Kraft (2001) who analyses the role of unemployment for the divorce risk 
of 7 300 German individuals. Even though the data is more up to date, 
the results show male unemployment to be more important than female 
unemployment. Male unemployment has a positive and significant effect 
on divorce, while for females, the magnitude of the effect is only half 
that of the male, and it is not significant in all specifications.  
 
Hansen (2005) is the only study finding female unemployment to be as 
important as male unemployment as a determinant of divorce. Analysing 
a panel of 8 933 Norwegian couples, he finds that the divorce risk in-
                                                 
3 See, for example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998). Introduction and Summary 
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creases, by the same magnitude, with both male and female unemploy-
ment.  
 
Kraft (2001) and Hansen (2005) utilize panel data methods, in terms of 
fixed and random effects approaches, when analysing the effect of un-
employment on the probability of dissolution. This seems reasonable 
since individual-specific effects could be present. However, they both 
treat unemployment as exogenous in the divorce equation. If unem-
ployment is endogenous, the estimated parameters will be biased and the 
effect of unemployment on divorce will be misinterpreted. 
 
5    Summary of the Papers 
 
Paper [I] 
Children’s School Achievement and Parental Work: An 
Analysis for Sweden 
 
This paper examines the determinants of children’s educational achie-
vement in Sweden. Special attention is given to the market work by 
mothers and fathers and their children’s educational achievement, meas-
ured as GPA from the ninth year of compulsory school and as GPA from 
the last year of upper secondary school, while controlling for a wide 
range of socioeconomic variables. The idea is that the child’s educa-
tional achievement is a household public good from which both parents 
derive utility. Both parents may contribute to the production of the 
household public good by allocating time to household production. 
 
The empirical part of the paper is based upon a dataset that contains in-
formation on about 70 000 students graduating from compulsory school 
and entering upper secondary school in 1994. The dataset includes gen-
der, nationality, age, place of residence, graduating GPA from the last 
year of compulsory school and the last year of upper secondary school, 
choice of educational programme in upper secondary school and finally, 
information about family structure and socioeconomic situation.  
 
One of the contributions of the paper is that the empirical part is based 
up Swedish data instead of data from the US. The institutional and social 
environment in Sweden differs from that of the US. For instance, Swe-
den has a well developed public child care system. It is possible that dif-
ferences in institutional setting or social environment could alter the re-
sults of the so-called “working mother hypothesis”. Since there is infor-
mation about the GPA both when the student graduated from compul-
sory school and when he/she graduated from upper secondary school, it 
is possible to analyse how the socioeconomic history of the child influ-Introduction and Summary 
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ences educational achievement during different stages of schooling. 
However, the most important contribution, pertaining from the richness 
of the data, is that the dataset contains information about the market 
work of both parents, making it possible to test if the work hours of fa-
thers are of importance in explaining children’s educational achieve-
ments.  
 
The analysis is carried out in three steps. First, the grade from the last 
year of upper secondary school is used as a dependent variable. This 
step captures the effects of parental market work on the children’s upper 
secondary school achievement. Second, the grade from the last year of 
compulsory school is used as a dependent variable. This captures the ef-
fect of parental labour market activities on the children’s school achie-
vement until compulsory school graduation. As a third step, in order to 
isolate the effects on GPA during upper secondary school, i.e., the value 
added effects, the difference between upper secondary school GPA and 
compulsory school GPA is used as the dependent variable.  
 
The main findings are that, in line with the working mother hypothesis, 
there is a positive effect of the mother’s income (conditional on hours of 
work) on the child’s performance in school. A higher income of fathers 
is also associated with higher GPA among children. The hours of labour 
market work by mothers influence the educational achievements of the 
children. If the mother works part time, this has a positive effect on the 
child’s grades as compared to if she works full time, which further con-
firms the existence of a working mother hypothesis. The effects are not 
only found in compulsory school, but are to some extent reinforced in 
upper secondary school, leaving quite an impact on the GPA when 
graduating from upper secondary school. There are no significant effects 
of the father’s hours of work on the compulsory school grades, but some 
evidence of a positive effect of part time work by fathers is found on 
upper secondary school GPA, which is in line with the effects of the 
mother. Therefore, the existence of a working father hypothesis cannot 
be rejected.  
 
Another finding is that children whose parents are divorced obtain lower 
grades, which could be explained in the setting of under-provision due 
to the non-cooperative behaviour of parents following divorce.  
 




Match Quality, Financial Surprises and the Dissolution of 
Commitments among Young Adults in Sweden 
 
The two dominating theories of divorce are (i) that a good quality of 
match is crucial for the stability of marriage, and (ii) that deviations be-
tween expected and realised utility from marriage can cause divorce. 
This paper analyses the role of financial surprises for commitment disso-
lution among Swedish couples. Two approaches are used to study the 
role of financial surprises on the probability of dissolution. First, the ef-
fects of short term surprises are studied, where a surprise is calculated as 
a deviation between predicted and observed earnings, following Svarer 
(2005). Second, the effects of surprises in long-run earnings capacity are 
studied. Surprises in long-run earnings capacity are calculated as in 
Weiss and Willis (1997).  
 
The empirical part is based upon a sub sample from a cohort of 110 000 
individuals born in 1973 and registered in Sweden on December 31, 
1990. The sub sample consists of those who were born in 1973 and 
committed to a partner who was also born in 1973 during the time pe-
riod 1991-2002. A couple is defined to be committed if they are cohabit-
ing with children or if they are married, with or without children. This 
leaves a sample consisting of 3 392 couples.  
 
The analysis is carried out in two steps. The first step involves calculat-
ing surprises in short-run earnings and long-run earnings capacity. For 
short-run earnings this is done by predicting earnings in each subsequent 
year based on observed characteristics in the year before and then com-
paring the predictions to the observed values. If the deviation is larger 
than 20 percent, it is regarded as either a positive (if the observed value 
is larger than the predicted value) or a negative (if the observed value is 
smaller than the predicted value) surprise. For long-run earnings capac-
ity a prediction, based on observables, about the earnings capacity at the 
last year of observation is made at the year of the start of the relation-
ship. The prediction is then revised every subsequent year based on the 
information in that year. The new prediction is finally compared to the 
original one and if the deviation is larger than 20 percent, it is inter-
preted as a surprise. Once more, the deviations are divided into positive 
and negative surprises in the same way as above. Step two involves pro-
bit estimation on the probability of separation in every year while con-
trolling for a wide range of determinants including the financial sur-
prises calculated in the first step.  
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The results show that unanticipated changes in economic circumstances 
do influence the stability of relationships. Positive surprises in short 
term earnings, by either partner, are associated with an increased prob-
ability of dissolution. This suggests that the experience of a positive sur-
prise in earnings for either partner seems to raise the values of outside 
options sufficiently for the relationship to end. If both partners experi-
ence a positive surprise at the same time, the effect is, instead, stabiliz-
ing. In this case, it seems as if the increased gain from staying in the 
commitment dominates the effect of a higher value of the outside alter-
native. 
 
For surprises in long-run earnings capacity, an unexpected decrease in 
male earnings increases the probability of dissolution. However, if the 
female experiences a positive surprise at the same time as the male ex-
periences a negative surprise, the effect is stabilizing. A possible expla-
nation is that women, who are able to change their labour market activi-
ties when their expectations about their partners’ long-run earnings ca-
pacity are lowered, actually do so. Another possibility is that these ef-
fects are the result of a deliberate choice made by the couple, i.e. there is 
an agreement that the male should decrease his labour market activity 
for the female to be able to increase hers.  
 
Other findings are that the relationship becomes more stable if the part-
ners start their commitment when they are older. Couples who live in a 
city are more likely to dissolve their relationship than others. The pres-
ence of very young children stabilizes the relationship, while there are 
no effects of the number of children. Higher income has a stabilizing ef-
fect, as does a higher educational level in some of the models specified. 
Negative shocks, i.e. unemployment for females, unemployment for 
males and having to receive social assistance, give ambiguous results. It 
seems as if partners are providing some insurance for each other in the 
case of unemployment, but that being on social assistance tends to in-
crease the probability of dissolution.  
 
Paper [III] 
The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution 
Decision among Young Swedes  
 
This paper studies the role played by unemployment, as an unexpected 
event, in the commitment dissolution decision among young Swedes. In 
previous literature, unemployment has been introduced as a control vari-
able, which is assumed to be exogenous. This may be problematic, how-
ever. First of all, when using the actual divorce date in these types of 
studies, the unemployment may have taken place after the relationship Introduction and Summary 
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has gone bad, even though it is observed before the actual divorce, since 
there is often a time gap between the decision and the reinforcement. 
The role of unemployment would then be misinterpreted. Another rea-
son why using unemployment as a control variable may be problematic 
is that there might be some, to the researcher, unobserved characteristic 
that influences the occurrence of both unemployment duration and prob-
ability of separation. An example might be the ability to live up to one’s 
obligations or promises. Such information is likely to influence both the 
number of days an individual will spend in unemployment in a given 
year and, at the same time, influence the probability that the individual 
will end up separating. If an individual who has, on average, longer un-
employment spells also has a less serious view of relationships, the ef-
fect of unemployment on separation will be biased upwards if unem-
ployment is introduced as an exogenous control variable.  
 
Because of the above discussion, the model estimated in this paper is a 
two-step simultaneous equation model accounting for the possible en-
dogeneity of unemployment. The possible appearance of additional in-
dividual-specific effects is accounted for by using a random effects 
method. The first step involves generalised least squares predictions of 
unemployment and the second step is a probit estimation of the separa-
tion equation.  
 
The empirical part is based upon a sub sample from a cohort of 110 000 
individuals born in 1973 and registered in Sweden on December 31, 
1990. The sub sample consists of those who were born in 1973 and 
committed to a partner during the time period 1993-2002. A couple is 
defined to be committed if they are cohabiting with children or if they 
are married, with or without children. Only the first committed relation-
ship of every individual in the sample is considered. Since it is possible 
that the effects of unemployment, or the correlation between unem-
ployment and divorce, differ between men and women, the analysis is 
carried out separately for males and females. The final sub samples con-
tain information on 18 764 males (with female partners) and 26 356 fe-
males (with male partners).  
 
The findings are that unemployment is endogenous in the separation de-
cision, and that the effect of unemployment on separation is biased when 
unemployment is assumed to be exogenous in the separation equation. 
When taking the endogeneity into account, the positive effect of unem-
ployment on dissolution is greater for males than when unemployment is 
treated as exogenous. This means that the effect in the simple probit 
equation was underestimated. The interpretation is that unobserved 
characteristics cause a downward bias. One example could be if you are Introduction and Summary 
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a careerist, which would have a negative effect on unemployment but 
could, if you work long hours, have a positive effect on the probability 
of separating.  
 
For females, the effect of unemployment on dissolution is instead nega-
tive. This result differs from earlier findings. One explanation could be 
the fact that, in previous studies, females have been found to initiate a 
separation more often than males, but that they are less likely to do so 
when they are unemployed. Another possible explanation may be that 
when females are unemployed, the non-market work is taken care of and 
the relationship becomes more stable. Unemployment may also reduce 
the double burden of market and non-market work for some females, 
which may act as stabilizing for the relationship. The effect could, natu-
rally, also be the result of a deliberate choice of the couple regarding di-
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ABSTRACT Data from Statistics Sweden on 70 000 students entering upper secondary
school in 1994 are used along with socioeconomic characteristics from the 1990 census to
explore the relationship between market work by parents in Sweden and their children’s
educational achievement, measured as the Grade Point Average. The results show that
there is a positive relationship between parental income and Grade Point Average.
Regarding the number of hours worked in the labour market, the results differ between
mothers and fathers. Having a mother that works less than full time has positive effects on
the child’s grades throughout the schooling of the child, whereas significant effects of the
hours of work that the father puts in are found during upper secondary school only.
KEY WORDS: Time allocation; labour force participation; educational 
achievements
Introduction
During the past 20 years, researchers in social sciences have been trying to find
explanations for why some children succeed in life while others do not. The
research has generated a number of theories and hypotheses regarding parental
characteristics and their influences on children’s success, measuring the degree of
success in several different ways; educational performance being the outcome
variable most widely used. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relation-
ship between the market work by mothers and fathers in Sweden and their chil-
dren’s educational achievement, measured as the Grade Point Average (GPA),
while controlling for a wide range of other socioeconomic variables.
One of the hypotheses that have gained a lot of attention in previous research is
the ‘working mother hypothesis’,1 where the labour force participation by moth-
ers is said to have two offsetting effects. The mother working and contributing to
family income may have a positive effect on the child’s future success. At the
same time, the mother’s absence from home may have a negative impact on the
child’s development. One of the reasons why it is interesting to do this type of
research using Swedish data is that Sweden, since the mid-1960s, has had an
Correspondence Address: Magdalena Norberg-Schönfeldt, Department of Economics, Umeå University,
Umeå, SE-901 87, Sweden. Email: magdalena.n-schonfeldt@econ.umu.se2 M. Norberg-Schönfeldt
extensive public child care system, which has encouraged the labour force
participation of women. Seen in the light of the working-mother hypothesis, it is
not obvious that such a policy would solely have positive effects on the child’s
development in the long run. Also, it is not obvious why only the hours worked
by mothers should matter; labour force participation by fathers might be of
importance as well. Previous studies have not included data on fathers’ labour
force participation.
Among the studies focusing on the school achievement, the centre of attention
has been on a variety of socioeconomic factors and parental characteristics. In
these studies, parental income has generally been found to have a strong positive
effect. Parental education and occupational status are also found to have positive
and significant effects on the children’s educational achievements (see Hill and
Duncan, 1987, for a review). The educational level of the mother has often been
found to be more highly correlated with the educational achievements of the
child than has the educational level of the father. The explanation is thought to be
that mothers usually spend more time with their children than fathers do (see
Leibowitz, 1977 ; Hill and Stafford, 1980). Growing up in a single-parent house-
hold seems to have a negative impact on outcomes, so does the number of
siblings if you are not the eldest (see McLanahan, 1985; Keith and Finlay, 1988).
The number of regional moves by the family and the number of school moves by
the student are also associated with poor academic performance. Other variables
found to be of importance are, for instance, gender, race and religion of the child.
When it comes to testing for the influence of the mothers’ work on the chil-
dren’s educational achievement, the results are inconclusive. Murnane et al. (1981)
find no evidence that children in low-income families whose mothers work
outside the home achieve less in school than children whose mothers do not work
outside the home. Leibowitz (1977) finds the same result for middle-class families.
Both these studies indicate that mothers who work outside the home decrease
their time spent on housework, but that they do not substantially decrease their
time spent with their children. Stafford (1987) finds a significant and negative
effect of mothers’ market work on the teacher’s ratings of the child, and recog-
nizes that there is a trade-off between market work and household work, which is
in line with the working-mother hypothesis. For children aged 12–15, Haveman
et al.(1991) instead find a positive relationship when studying market work by
mothers and its effect on the child’s performance in school, measured as high
school completion. The authors find no evidence of the ‘absent from home’ aspect
of the working-mother hypothesis.
Socioeconomic background is not the only thing taken into consideration in the
literature on children’s educational achievements. School specific variables such
as the number of students in each class, the number of teachers and the overall
school spending is also often included. In a series of reviews on research consider-
ing production and efficiency in public schools by Hanushek (1986, 1989, 1996,
1997, 2003), educational inputs are found to be relatively unimportant in explain-
ing student outcomes, and the impact of any particular input has been varying
across studies. Krueger (2003) reanalyses the data in Hanushek’s reviews and
finds that the results from the literature summaries are critically dependent upon
the weight that each study is given. Moreover, there are some recent studies find-
ing effects of school variables and this makes it important to control for them as
well. Bonesrønning (2003), for example, in a study based on Norwegian data,
finds a negative effect of class size on individual student’s school performance.Children’s School Achievement and Parental Work 3
One of the contributions of this paper, as mentioned before, is that the
empirical part is based upon Swedish data instead of data from the United States.
The institutional and social environment in Sweden differs from that of the
United States; for instance, Sweden has a well-developed public childcare system,
where a large portion of children participates.2 In addition, it is fairly common for
Swedish fathers to take parental leave,3 and parents often share custody after
divorce. It is possible that a different institutional setting and a different social
environment could alter the results of the working-mother hypothesis. For
instance, the ‘away from home’ part of the working-mother hypothesis might not
be present due to somebody educated in caring for children stepping in for the
mother when she is working. It could also be the case that, since women from all
different social groups to a large extent are working in Sweden, it is more social
acceptable for woman to be away from home, which could in turn lessen the
negative effects on children. Another contribution is the richness of the data. The
data-set contains about 70 000 individuals and includes a wide variety of socio-
economic variables, enabling control for many aspects that may influence
children’s educational achievement. Moreover, there is information about the
GPA both when the student graduated from compulsory school and when he/
she graduated from upper secondary school. This means that it is possible to
analyse how the socioeconomic history of the child influences educational
achievement during different stages of schooling. However, the most important
contribution, pertaining from the richness of the data, is that the data-set contains
labour force participation of both parents, making it possible to test whether the
labour force participation of fathers is of importance in explaining children’s
educational achievements.
The paper is outlined as follows: the empirical strategy together with a descrip-
tion of the data can be found in the next section, and in the third section the
empirical findings are presented and discussed. The final section gives a conclud-
ing summary.
Empirical Strategy and Data
The tradition in Swedish schooling is that the schools are run by municipalities
and that schooling is free of charge.4 The Swedish public school system consists of
nine years of compulsory schooling. After that, students can continue on to two or
three years of non-compulsory schooling5 in the form of upper secondary school.
The most common way that students are accepted to upper secondary school is
on the basis of their GPA from compulsory school, within the specific reception
area of their municipality; and almost all students in Sweden do continue on to
upper secondary school (about 95% in 1994). The upper secondary school drop-
out rate was about seven per cent among those who entered in 1994.
This paper is based on the idea that the child’s educational achievement is a
household public good, to which both parents may contribute.6 The setting is as
follows. Consider a household with two adult members and a child. Each adult
household member derives utility from the consumption of leisure, purely
private goods and services, and a household public good. The latter is to be inter-
preted as the educational achievements of the child, which is partly produced
within the household.7 There is a trade-off between the consumption of private
goods and services and the quality of the household public good since, by
choosing to work at home, the spouse contributes to the child’s educational4 M. Norberg-Schönfeldt
achievement. The spouses are not by necessity equally productive in providing
the proper care that the child needs to succeed in school. Their productivity in
doing so is determined by, for instance, their own education, since the latter could
be expected to be closely related to their ability to provide proper help with
homework, and so forth.
As suggested by the empirical studies discussed in the Introduction, the child’s
educational achievement is most probably not fully explained by parent-related
variables, such as the time that the parents devote to their children or their
productivity, but might also be depending on municipality-specific variables
such as the number of teachers available, and variables specific to the child itself
such as gender or ethnicity. The variables used to estimate the influence of socio-
economic characteristics on the child’s educational achievement are therefore
divided into three groups: child-related variables, parent-related variables, and
municipality-related variables.
The data-set contains information on about 70 000 students graduating from
compulsory school and entering upper secondary school in 1994.8 The data were
retrieved from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and contain school information along with
socioeconomic characteristics from the 1990 census. The data-set includes gender,
nationality, age, residence, graduating GPA from the last year of compulsory
school and the last year of upper secondary school, choice of educational
programme in upper secondary school and, finally, information about family
structure and socioeconomic situation. The parent-related variables, describing
family structure and socioeconomic situation, were measured in 1990 and are
therefore treated as exogenous in the estimations. One can debate about the ideal
age (of the child) at which to measure parental characteristics. Ideally, one would
like to measure the accumulated parental effort and income over the entire child-
hood. One advantage of having an early measure of parental effort could be that
the ground for good grades is built early and that more parents would be
observed as part-time workers when their child is young. The advantage of
measuring parental effort later during the childhood is that it is likely that paren-
tal inputs during the schooling of the child—such as, for instance, help with
homework—are important contributors to the child’s educational achievements.
Another advantage is that parents who are observed as working part-time in 1990
are likely to have been doing so during the child’s entire childhood. Therefore, the
effects of having parents working part-time earlier during the childhood are also
likely to be captured. If parental characteristics are measured early, one risk is
that parents are observed to be working part-time due to the birth of a younger
sibling. Here, the latter seems less likely, considering that the child has reached
the age 12 when the parental characteristics are measured. To be able to address
the effects of measuring parental characteristics earlier or later during the child-
hood, much more comprehensive data would be required.
For the purpose of exploring the determinants of children’s educational
achievement during the different stages of schooling, with special attention given
to the effects of market work by mothers and fathers, the analysis will be carried
out in three steps. First, the grade from the last year of upper secondary school is
used as the dependent variable. This step captures the effects of parental labour
force participation on the children’s upper secondary school achievement.
Second, the grade from the last year of compulsory school is used as the depen-
dent variable. This captures the effect of parental labour force participation on the
children’s school achievement up until compulsory school graduation. As a thirdChildren’s School Achievement and Parental Work 5
step, in order to isolate the effects on GPA during upper secondary school (i.e.,
the value added effects), the difference between the upper secondary school GPA
and the compulsory school GPA is used as the dependent variable. The depen-
dent variables used in the regressions are further explained in the next subsection,
and the explanatory variables are subsequently discussed. Descriptive statistics
are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
Dependent Variables
The students that graduated from compulsory school with grades from a norm-
referenced grading system where the ‘average class’ of the nation (riksklass) set
the standard; the grading was to follow a normal distribution where the spread of
abilities among the students in the whole country was represented. That grading
system had a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest grade you could obtain
and 3 representing average achievement. During the schooling of these students,
the grading system in Sweden was changed. When graduating from upper
secondary school, the students were instead graded according to a criterion refer-
enced system where the focus was to estimate how well the student had met a
standardized knowledge criterion instead of comparing the students with the
‘average class’.9 The new grading system had, and still has, four levels; fail, pass,
pass with distinction, and pass with special distinction. This four-level scale can
then be converted into a quantified scale, where the grade is weighted with
course load and length of the course. The grade is then positioned on a scale
between 0 and 200.
Since the grade system was changed during the schooling of these students, the
grades are not directly comparable. Therefore, in order to facilitate comparisons,
both grades are transformed into standard normal variables, with mean zero and
variance one.10 When analysing value added effects, the difference between the
transformed grades is taken and it is then possible to study whether a student
changes his or her position within the distribution in upper secondary school.
When studying effects on upper secondary school GPA and value added
effects, the estimation is carried out separately for different types of educational
programmes. This is done because children in different educational programmes
take different courses, and because teacher ratings might differ between
educational programmes. The division into educational programmes is further
motivated by the fact that the choice of educational programme is likely to be
endogenous in the context of educational achievement, since a child with a
specific grade tends to choose a specific programme. The educational
programmes have been divided into three groups,11 based on types of courses
and admission GPA: three-year social sciences (SS) education, three-year natural
or technical sciences (NT) education and two-year vocational training (VT).
Programme-specific descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
Explanatory Variables
Child-related variables.  The child-related variables consist of child-specific charac-
teristics that might influence the child’s grade, such as gender, ethnicity and
whether the child has lived through a divorce.12 In addition, a dummy variable




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Children’s School Achievement and Parental Work 9
parents might affect the grade, since, for example, these parents may have a
harder time helping their children with homework because of unfamiliarity with
the school system or difficulties with language. This might be even more obvious
in the case of the child itself being born abroad, simply because the parents have
been in Sweden for a relatively short time period. The child itself might also have
trouble with the language; therefore, a second dummy is included for this group.
A third dummy is included for children born abroad with Swedish born parents,
since this group to a large extent consists of adopted children who, according to
some earlier research (see, e.g., Brodzinsky et al., 1984), have been found to have a
harder time succeeding in school.
A dummy measuring whether the child has lived through a divorce or not is
included because it is likely that living in dissolved families is associated with
different kinds of problems. Divorced parents might not have the same resources,
in the form of time and money, to provide for their children as do two-parent fami-
lies. As a consequence, children from dissolved households might have disadvan-
tages compared with other children, which might affect their achievements.
Parent-related variables.  The parent-related variables are from the 1990 census and
they consist of total parental income and parental hours of work in the labour
market as well as other parent-related variables. The other parent-related vari-
ables are included to control for the productivity of parents in the production of
educational achievement of the child, since it is not possible to directly observe
this productivity. There are some missing observations for the parent-related
variables and, in order to account for possible systematic effects of the missing
observations, all the parent-related variables have been reconstructed and
multiplied with a dummy variable that takes the value one if the observation
from one, or the other, of the parents is missing. For example, the mother’s age is
included as: 
This means that if the information about maternal age is missing, the dummy
variable for missing information about the mother will take the value one, and the
expression within parentheses will be zero. The effect about having missing
observations on parents will, hence, be captured by the parameter γi.13
Following the working-mother hypothesis, the total labour income is likely to
have positive effects on the child’s grade. A squared deviation from the mean
total income is also included in order to account for possible non-linearities. Even
though it follows from the working-mother hypothesis that children’s school
achievements should be increasing with income, it is likely that the effect is
declining as the income increases. Regarding the hours of work that the parents
put into the labour market, the reference case is working full time (35 hours or
more). Parents not working at all or working part-time, either between 1 and 19
hours or between 20 and 34 hours, is then compared with the reference case. (The
parental hours of work variables are the variables that are characterized by the
greatest number of missing observations. Since these variables are of special inter-
est here, additional missing observation constructions, like the one mentioned
above, are created for parental hours of work.) The other parent-related variables
consist of parental age, together with squared deviations from the mean age (to
account for possible non-linearities) and two dummy variables for parental upper
βγ i  *(1-info. missing, mother)+ info. missing, mother. mother's age i10 M. Norberg-Schönfeldt
secondary education and parental higher education, in the form of undergraduate
or graduate university studies, respectively.14  The reference case for parental
education is compulsory school. The parental education dummies are likely to
have a positive effect on the child’s school achievements.
Municipality-related variables.  The municipality-related variables consist of the
average number of students registered in the municipality during the three years
of schooling and the average number of teachers per 100 students. The first is
meant to capture the effect of living in a larger municipality with larger schools
and larger classes. The second variable is included since it might have a positive
effect on the child’s school performance if there are more teachers devoting their
time to the child.
Empirical Findings
Effects on Upper Secondary School GPA
This subsection concerns the determinants of upper secondary school achieve-
ments by the child. The GPA when graduating from upper secondary school,
transformed into a standard normal variable, is used as dependent variable.
Special attention is given to the role of parental labour force participation on the
child’s educational achievement. The analysis is carried out separately for three
types of educational programmes and the results are presented in Table 3.
Child-related variables.  As can be seen in Table 3, the signs and significance levels
of the coefficients are not changing much between the three programmes. In
accordance with previous research, male students achieve a lower upper second-
ary school GPA than do female students.
For students participating in VT or taking the SS programmes, the effect of
having parents that were born abroad is negative. However, there is no signifi-
cant effect for students taking the NT programmes. It seems that the students in
the VT and SS programmes are more sensitive to having parents that might not be
able to provide as much help with homework. When the student is born abroad
with parents being born abroad as well, this has a negative effect on the total GPA
regardless of educational programme. This might be due to the fact that having a
good knowledge of the language, in which the courses are being taught, is crucial
in order to benefit from the education; the effect here is greater than the effect of
only having parents born abroad. Being a child born abroad with Swedish-born
parents has a negative effect on the grades. One might suspect that many of the
children in this group are adopted, which means that they should not be
experiencing the same language difficulties as their foreign-born peers might be
experiencing. The negative coefficient is in line with some previous findings (see,
e.g., Brodzinsky et al., 1984) and might be due to identity issues that some of these
children are faced with. Furthermore, as in McLanahan (1985) and Keith and
Finlay (1988), the experience of a separation between the parents is found to have
a negative effect on the child’s GPA from upper secondary school. In the setting
of the educational achievement of the child as the household public good, is not
surprising that a lesser amount of the household public good will be produced in
the case of divorce, since a divorced couple is more likely to behave non-
cooperatively than a married couple.15Children’s School Achievement and Parental Work 11
Parent-related variables.  Both total income and human capital of the parents,
measured as the number of years of schooling, are variables that frequently are
included in studies of children’s educational achievement. The two variables are
almost always found to be positively associated with the educational achieve-
ment of the child. For students taking SS programmes or the NT programmes it
can be seen that, when hours of work are controlled for, the child’s upper second-
ary school GPA increases with parents’ total income (although the effect is
decreasing as the income is increasing above the mean income) as well as with
parents’ education. The mother’s income having a positive effect on the child’s
educational achievement is consistent with the working-mother hypothesis. For
students in VT, however, the total income of the mother has no significant effect.
The total income of the mother, however, is lower for students in this group, and
Table 3. Estimation results for the upper secondary school GPA, programme 
speciﬁc
Variable SS GPA NT GPA VT GPA
Constant −0.97*** −0.82*** −0.46***
Male −0.42*** −0.38*** −0.42***
Parents born abroad −0.10*** −0.03 −0.11***
Child born abroad −0.32*** −0.26*** −0.37***
Child born abroad, Swedish parents −0.53*** −0.35*** −0.44***
Divorce −0.06*** −0.07*** −0.08***
Mother age 0.009*** 0.01*** 0.01***
Mother age, squared deviation from mean −0.0007*** −0.0003 −0.001***
Father age 0.006*** 0.005** 0.006***
Father age, squared deviation from mean −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0002
Mother upper secondary education 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08***
Father upper secondary education 0.03 0.02 0.06***
Mother higher education 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.24***
Father higher education 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.09***
Mother 0 hours −0.04 −0.03 −0.05
Mother 1–19 hours −0.05 0.14* 0.12*
Mother 20–34 hours 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06***
Mother hours missing 0.05* 0.03 −0.04**
Father 0 hours −0.01 −0.07 −0.06
Father 1–19 hours 0.21*** −0.04 −0.05
Father 20–34 hours 0.05 0.13** −0.03
Father hours missing −0.10*** 0.10** −0.06**
Mother total income 0.07*** 0.09*** −0.01
Mother income, squared deviation from mean −0.000001* −0.00001*** 0.000006
Father total income 0.02*** 0.01** 0.02**
Father income, squared deviation from mean −0.0000001*** −0.00000003* −0.0000003**
Info missing, mother 0.37*** 0.62*** 0.40***
Info missing, father 0.44*** 0.22* 0.20**
Number of students 0.01*** 0.01*** −0.004***
Teacher density 0.03*** −0.005 0.001
R2 adjusted 0.10 0.10 0.08
Number of observations 21716 13888 28036
Note: Dependent variable: upper secondary school GPA (standard normal). *Statistically significant at
the 10% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, ***statistically significant at the 1% level.12 M. Norberg-Schönfeldt
the variation is smaller, than in the other groups. The positive effect of the
mother’s educational level is larger than that of the father’s, which suggests that
for upper secondary school GPA the human capital of the mother is more impor-
tant. This result is in accordance with previous research (e.g., Leibowitz, 1977;
Hill and Stafford, 1980). When it comes to parental age, children whose parents
were young when their child was born attain lower grades than those whose
parents where older. For mothers, the effect is present, as long as she is not more
than a few years older than the mean age. This result is in line with previous find-
ings, and could be explained by the results found by Sousa-Posa et al. (2001); that
is, time spent on childcare by both mothers and fathers respectively increases
with the age of parents.
Again, in accordance with the working-mother hypothesis, the hours of work
performed by mothers seems to be of importance for children’s educational
achievements. If the mother works part time when the child is 12 years old this
has a positive effect on the child’s upper secondary school GPA relative to the
reference case of the mother working full time. The exception is that no significant
effect of having a mother that works 1–19 hours is found for the students in SS
programmes. These results are in line with the findings by Stafford (1987). The
analysis in Stafford was performed using US data and it was suspected that since
Sweden has an extensive public childcare system there would not be any effects
of the mother being away from home. However, the results show that despite the
high participation in public childcare among children in Sweden, the ‘away from
home’ part of the working-mother hypothesis is present. Even though the effects
are significant, it is important to note that they are small compared with the effect
of, for example, higher education of the parents. However, given that there is a
positive effect of having a mother working part-time, the effects here are likely to
be underestimated, since more mothers would probably have been observed as
working part-time had the measure been taken at an earlier point of time during
the childhood. Having a mother that does not work at all is just as bad as having a
mother that works full time, which is instead speaking against the working-
mother hypothesis. If not working at all is due to involuntary unemployment,
there may be other factors associated with this that are equally bad for the child’s
educational achievements as having a mother that works full time.
The numbers of hours worked by the father also seem to be of some impor-
tance. There are positive effects on the upper secondary school grades for
students in the SS programmes of having a father that works 1–19 hours. There is
also a positive effect of having a father that works 20–34 hours for students in the
NT programmes. According to these results the existence of a working-father
hypothesis cannot be rejected. One should, however, keep in mind that the
variance in the number of hours worked by the fathers is small, and the results
should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Municipality-related variables.  For students in the SS programmes and the NT
programmes the GPA is increasing with the number of students in the munici-
pality. This implies that students in larger municipalities perform better than
students in, for example, the countryside. On average, the schools are larger in
larger municipalities, which suggest that children in larger schools perform
better. For students in VT, however, the effect is the opposite. The reason for
this might be that there is a different view on VT programmes in the country-
side than in other parts of the country, and that these programmes, therefore,Children’s School Achievement and Parental Work 13
attract more able students in the countryside than in the cities. As has been
stated, educational inputs are often found to be relatively unimportant in
explaining student outcomes. The same is true for the number of teachers per
100 students; it does not seem to be important except for students in the SS
programmes where the GPA is found to be increasing with teacher density. One
possible explanation might be that the students in the SS programmes to a
larger extent choose their field of special interest16  than do students in the
other  programmes, and if there are more teachers available they are more
likely to get their preferred field. If they get their preferred field of study, they
might be more interested in their studies and, as a consequence, might perform
better.
Compulsory School and Value Added Effects
In this subsection the estimation of the determinants of GPA when graduating
from compulsory school and the change in GPA during upper secondary school
are presented and analysed separately. Again, the role of parental labour force
participation is given special attention, and both grades are transformed standard
normal variables.
Compulsory school effects.  When estimating the determinants of compulsory
school GPA, the GPA when graduating from ninth grade is the dependent vari-
able. The results are presented in Table 4.
It is apparent that male students perform worse than female students already in
compulsory school. Having parents that were born abroad has no significant
effect on the GPA when graduating from compulsory school; these effects are
therefore likely to appear first in upper secondary school. The other child-related
variables show the same signs and significance, and are of roughly the same size,
as when the upper secondary school GPA was analysed.
The effects of parental age, income and education are similar to those that were
found for upper secondary school GPA. The effects of maternal labour force
participation are present already in compulsory school, but when it comes to the
number of hours worked by the father there are no significant effects on the
child’s grades. There seems to be no support for a working-father hypothesis in
the earlier schooling of the child. Finally, the compulsory school GPA is increas-
ing both with the number of students in the municipality and with the number of
teachers per 100 students.
Value added effects.  For the analysis of achievements during upper secondary
school, the difference between the upper secondary school GPA and the
compulsory school GPA, both transformed into standard normal variables, is
used as a dependent variable. The analysis is again carried out separately for
the  three types of educational programmes and the results are presented in
Table 5.
In Table 5 it can be seen that male students are increasing their grade more than
female students during upper secondary school; however, the positive effect is
smaller than the negative effect they were experiencing during compulsory
school, which gives the total negative effect found when upper secondary school
GPA was analysed. Having parents that were born abroad is here found to be
negative for students participating in VT or taking the SS programmes; this is an14 M. Norberg-Schönfeldt
effect that was not visible when the compulsory school grades of all students
were analysed, but that was found for students in these programmes when the
upper secondary school GPA was studied.
Being born abroad with parents that were born abroad was found to have nega-
tive effects both on compulsory school GPA and on the upper secondary school
GPA. For students in NT programmes and students in VT, it is clear that the nega-
tive effect on the upper secondary school achievement does not solely have to do
with not being able to catch up during upper secondary school. For these
students, there are additional negative effects of being a first-generation immi-
grant during upper secondary school. Being a child born abroad with Swedish
born parents or having lived through a divorce at a young age seems to matter
only during the earlier stages of schooling, since there are no additional effects
during upper secondary school.
Table 4. Estimation results for the compulsory school GPA
Variable GPA ninth grade
Constant −1.07***
Male −0.40***
Parents born abroad 0.02
Child born abroad −0.08***
Child born abroad, Swedish parents −0.53***
Divorce −0.14***
Mother age 0.01***
Mother age, squared deviation from mean −0.001***
Father age 0.005***
Father age, squared deviation from mean −0.0002**
Mother upper secondary education 0.15***
Father upper secondary education 0.13***
Mother higher education 0.49***
Father higher education 0.39***
Mother 0 hours 0.02
Mother 1–19 hours 0.10**
Mother 20–34 hours 0.08***
Mother hours missing 0.05**
Father 0 hours −0.04
Father 1–19 hours −0.02
Father 20–34 hours −0.01
Father hours missing 0.001
Mother total income 0.08***
Mother income, squared deviation from mean −0.000001***
Father total income 0.02***
Father income, squared deviation from mean −0.0000001***
Info missing, mother 0.65***
Info missing, father 0.26***
Number of students 0.003***
Teacher density 0.01**
R2 adjusted 0.17
Number of observations 69348
Note: Dependent variable: compulsory school GPA (standard normal). *Statistically significant at the
10% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, ***statistically significant at the 1% level.Children’s School Achievement and Parental Work 15
For students taking the SS programmes or the NT programmes, it can be
seen that there are additional positive effects during the child’s upper
secondary education from parental education, when hours of work are
controlled for. During upper secondary school there is no longer a dominating
effect of the mother’s human capital; instead, the human capital of the father is
more important. For students in VT, the GPA achieved during upper second-
ary school is decreasing with parental education. The reason could be that,
when being in compulsory school, these students could get help with theoreti-
cal courses from highly educated parents. However, in upper secondary
school, they need help with more practical courses, and highly educated
parents are not by necessity able to better provide that help than less educated
parents.
Table 5. Estimation results for value added effects, programme speciﬁc
Variable SS GPA NT GPA VT GPA
Constant −0.82*** −1.01*** −0.26***
Male 0.14*** 0.26*** 0.06***
Parents born abroad −0.04*** −0.001 −0.05***
Child born abroad 0.04 −0.07** −0.18***
Child born abroad, Swedish parents −0.03 −0.09 −0.02
Divorce −0.003 −0.02 0.003
Mother age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001
Mother age, squared deviation from mean −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.00002
Father age 0.004*** 0.001 0.003**
Father age, squared deviation from mean −0.0002 −0.00001 −0.00001
Mother upper secondary education 0.02* 0.03 −0.003
Father upper secondary education 0.01 0.02 0.002
Mother higher education 0.05*** 0.05*** −0.04**
Father higher education 0.06*** 0.09*** −0.01*
Mother 0 hours −0.03 0.01 −0.07**
Mother 1–19 hours −0.01 0.06 0.08
Mother 20–34 hours 0.02* 0.03** −0.03**
Mother hours missing 0.04* 0.05* −0.03
Father 0 hours −0.02 0.06 −0.001
Father 1–19 hours 0.05* −0.009 −0.08
Father 20–34 hours −0.01 0.07** −0.03
Father hours missing −0.01 0.06* −0.01
Mother total income 0.03*** 0.02* 0.007
Mother income, squared deviation from mean −0.0000003 −0.000003 0.0000004
Father total income 0.02*** 0.01** 0.02***
Father income, squared deviation from mean −0.0000001*** −0.00000002* −0.0000003***
Info missing, mother 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.08
Info missing, father 0.27*** 0.08 0.19***
Number of students 0.001*** 0.006*** −0.01***
Teacher density 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.008*
R2 adjusted 0.03 0.05 0.01
Number of observations 21716 13888 28036
Note: Dependent variable: difference between compulsory and upper secondary school GPA (standard
normal). *Statistically significant at the 10% level, **statistically significant at the 5% level, ***statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level.16 M. Norberg-Schönfeldt
During upper secondary school there are additional positive effects of paren-
tal income; the exception is again students in VT, where the income of the
mother does not seem to matter at all. There are some additional positive effects
during upper secondary school of having older parents, but now the effects are
linear. There are also additional positive effects on the GPA achieved during
upper secondary school for the SS and NT students, if the mother worked less
than full time but more than half-time when the child was 12 years old. For VT
students, on the other hand, there is instead a small negative effect of having a
mother that worked less than full time, but more than half-time. A negative
effect of unemployed mothers is also found for the VT students. The positive
effects of fathers working less than full time, which were discussed when the
upper secondary school GPA was analysed, are arising during upper secondary
school.
For all students, the effects of going to school in a larger municipality are the
same as they were when the upper secondary school GPA was studied. During
upper secondary school, the grades are increasing with teacher density for
students in NT and SS programmes.
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
This paper examines the determinants of children’s educational achievement.
Special attention is focused on the effects of parental hours of work on children’s
educational achievement, measured as the GPA from ninth year of compulsory
school and as the GPA from the last year of upper secondary school, while
controlling for a wide range of socioeconomic variables. The empirical part is
based on data for students graduating from compulsory school and entering
upper secondary school in 1994 (about 70 000 individuals).
The main findings are that, in line with the working-mother hypothesis and
with previous research, there is a positive effect of the mother’s income (contin-
gent on hours of work) on the child’s performance in school. A higher income by
fathers is also associated with a higher GPA among children. The hours of labour
market work by mothers influences the educational achievements of the children.
If the mother works part-time it has a positive effect on the child’s grades. This
confirms the working-mother hypothesis and is in line with previous studies, for
example Stafford (1987). The effects are not only found in compulsory school, but
are to some extent strengthened in upper secondary school, leaving quite an
impact on the GPA when graduating from upper secondary school. There are no
significant effects of the father’s hours of work on the compulsory school grades,
but some effects in line with those of the mother are found on upper secondary
school GPA. Therefore, the existence of a working-father hypothesis cannot be
rejected. However, because of the small variation in the hours of work by fathers,
this area must be further explored before the existence of a working-father
hypothesis can be considered proven.
Unfortunately the data-set used in this paper does not contain information on
the labour force outcomes of children. Since the effects of parental labour force
participation are, to some extent, strengthened during upper secondary school,
future research with a different data-set could be focused on analysing whether
the effects found in this paper prevail into adulthood. To further investigate the
working-mother hypothesis and the existence of a possible working-father
hypothesis, it would be desirable to have more extensive information on parentalChildren’s School Achievement and Parental Work 17
labour force participation. For example, in the present data-set it is not possible to
separate between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. In the light of the
working-mother hypothesis the effects of parental unemployment on the educa-
tional achievement of children are likely to be very different depending on
whether the unemployment is voluntary or not. It would also be interesting to
have information about parental labour force participation during the whole
childhood of the children. In that case it could be investigated at what time
children are most sensitive to the parents being away from home.
Another interesting area for future research is the sharing of parental leave
and its effects on children’s educational achievements later in life. Sharing
parental leave is something that is becoming more and more common in
Sweden and there is an ongoing debate about a proposed legislation relating to
shared parental leave. With regard to this debate, future research could be
focused on analysing whether it matters for the future educational achievement
of children if the father or the mother was staying at home when the child was
really young. There might also be different effects depending on whether the
child is a boy or a girl.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Magnus Wikström, Thomas Aronsson, Carina
Selander, Linda Holmlund and Erik Norlin at the Department of Economics,
Umeå University for their comments, invaluable help and, most of all, their
patience in the creation of this paper. The author would also like to thank Profes-
sor Steve Bradley, the editor of Education Economics, and two anonymous referees
for many helpful comments and suggestions and for pointing out errors and
typos in a previous version. Financial support from the Swedish Council for
Working Life and Social Research is gratefully acknowledged.
Notes
1. The hypothesis is first mentioned by Haveman et al. (1991). Hetherington et al. (1983) found results
consistent with the hypothesis.
2. According to Statistics Sweden, in 1980 approximately 600 000 children were between the ages of
one and six. Of those, about 360 000 were registered in public childcare. In 1985, 424 000 out of 565
000 were registered. During the pre-school age of the children in this study, public childcare
consisted of daycare centres (nowadays preschools), registered childminding homes and nursery
schools (the two latter are both almost non-existent today). Even though the demand for public
childcare has exceeded the supply by far during its whole existence, the supply and availability in
Sweden is large compared with the supply of public childcare in many other countries. For more
information on the Swedish public childcare system, see for instance Gustafsson and Stafford
(1992).
3. In 1978 paid parental leave was restricted to eight months and less than five per cent of the avail-
able days were never collected. About seven per cent of the paid parental leave days were
collected by fathers.
4. Private schools have traditionally been scarce in Sweden, partly because of restrictive policies and
partly due to limitations in receiving public grants or other funding. In 1994 there were 166 private
compulsory schools and 21 private upper secondary schools in Sweden. Since then, private
schools have become more common, and in 2004 there were 506 private compulsory schools and
234 private upper secondary schools.
5. The group of students examined here was the last one that was able to choose a two-year upper
secondary education. Now, the upper secondary school in Sweden consist only of different three-
year educational programmes.18 M. Norberg-Schönfeldt
6. See Bergstrom (1997) for an overview of production functions for household public goods.
7. Weiss and Willis (1985) are among the first to treat the well-being of children as a household
public good that enters the utility of both parents.
8. About 65 000 of the students were born in 1978, 500 were born in 1979 and 4500 were born in
1977. A large portion of the students born in 1977 are first-generation or second-generation
immigrants.
9. The grade system was changed due to criticism that it was not knowledge orientated enough and
that the comparisons led to strong competitiveness among the students. For more information
about the Swedish school and grade system before and after the changes, see for example
Wikström and Wikström (2005).
10. Regression results without transformations can be obtained from the author upon request.
11. When dividing the students into three types of programmes, the sample is reduced with about
7000 individuals. The students that have been excluded are participants in minor programmes; for
example, those who are studying an individually adapted programme. The reason for the
exclusion is that there are too few of these students to separately study them.
12. It is not always obvious to which specific group a variable should belong, and the division is
therefore very subjective at times. For instance, the divorce dummy could be argued to be parent
related. The reason why it is included as child related is that it is supposed to capture whether the
child has lived through a divorce between its biological parents. The parents themselves could
have been divorced more than once.
13. The idea to treat missing observations in this manner comes from Weiss and Willis (1997).
14. The information available on parental education is whether they attended compulsory school,
whether they attended upper secondary school (in the form of vocational training or a theoretical
track), whether they have more or less than three years of university education and whether they
have a PhD degree. Different specifications for parental education have been tried without
affecting the qualitative results. For instance, a model with five different educational dummy
variables, one for each educational level, has been considered.
15. The most famous non-cooperative game theory model for intra-household distribution is
developed from the literature of private provision for public goods (see, e.g., Warr, 1982;
Bergstrom et al., 1986). For a more specific example of the behaviour of divorced parents, see
Weiss and Willis (1985).
16. The social sciences students take their first year of studies together and are then able to choose
whether to take a special interest in business administration, media and communication,
languages (depending on which ones are offered at the school) or social sciences.
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Abstract. The role of financial surprises and match quality in the disso-
lution of relationships is explored. The analysis is carried out both for 
surprises in the short term earnings and surprises in the long-run earn-
ings capacity. It is found that positive surprises in short term earnings 
have a destabilizing effect for a relationship. Generally, a negative sur-
prise in long-run earnings capacity for males has a destabilizing effect. 
However, if it is combined with a female positive surprise, the effect is 
stabilizing. Commitments become more stable the older the spouses are 
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When you make a commitment to another person, the decision is based 
on the stock of information available at that point in time. There will, 
however, be a number of factors about which you will lack knowledge. 
You cannot know with certainty, for example, the long-run earnings ca-
pacity of the person to whom you are committing. It may even be hard 
to foresee the income your partner will have next year. Indeed, factors of 
this kind could cause you to revaluate the gain you may obtain from the 
commitment. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the role of finan-
cial surprises and match quality on the separation rate in Sweden.  
 
As in other Western societies, Sweden has been experiencing decreasing 
marriage rates along with increasing divorce rates over the past four de-
cades. In their pioneering article, Becker et al. (1977) identified two 
main explanations for marital instability. First, a marriage that is initially 
acceptable can become unacceptable, if you encounter a better match. 
Second, factors that influence the utility of marriage can change unex-
pectedly over time. The first studies to use longitudinal data in the ex-
amination of the explanations of divorce, discussed by Becker et al. 
(1977), were Hoffman and Duncan (1995) and Weiss and Willis (1997). 
Hoffman and Duncan focus on the second of the two explanations of di-
vorce. They find that income and wages have only minor effects on di-
vorce rates; and that whilst increases in AFDC (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) benefits slightly increase the probability of mar-
riage dissolution, increases in the husband’s earnings and the wife’s 
wage rate slightly reduce the probability of divorce. Weiss and Willis, 
when examining both explanations of divorce, find, in line with Becker 
et al., that couples who marry later in life are more likely to have a last-
ing relationship. When studying unanticipated changes in economic cir-
cumstances, they find that an unexpected increase in the husband’s earn-
ings capacity tends to reduce the probability for divorce, while an unex-
pected increase in the wife’s earning capacity, instead, tends to increase 
it.  
 
One of the more recent papers focusing on both explanations is Svarer 
(2005). He finds that cohabitation prior to marriage decreases the prob-
ability of divorce, and that short-run deviations between expected and 
observed earnings affect the probability of divorce in a way that is 
asymmetric between men and women. In the case of women, deviations 
in either direction increase the divorce rate, while, for men, positive de-
viations have a stabilizing effect and negative deviations have a destabi-
lizing effect on the marriage. Georgellis (1996) and Svarer (2002, 2004) 
all focus on the first explanation and investigate whether cohabitation Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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prior to marriage decreases the probability of divorce. Aassve (2001), 
Böheim and Ermisch (2001), and Walker and Zhu (2006) focus, instead, 
on the role of unexpected changes in economic circumstances.  
 
Even though Sweden is among the countries with the highest divorce or 
separation rates in the world, very little has been written on the Swedish 
situation. The three studies that, to our knowledge, exist are based on 
data from the 1981 fertility survey called Women in Sweden. These are 
Bennett et al. (1988) who focused on the question of premarital cohabi-
tation and subsequent divorce, and Hoem and Hoem (1992) and Trussell 
et al. (1992) who examined different determinants of union dissolution. 
These studies based on Swedish data were conducted using data that was 
obtained during a period when women in Sweden where still in the 
process of entering the labour market and cohabitation prior to marriage 
was not as widespread as today.  
 
Except for the three Swedish studies, the earlier literature regarding di-
vorce is largely based on data from the UK, the US and Denmark. Swe-
den differs from both the US and the UK in several aspects, but displays 
many similarities to Denmark. For instance, the female labour force par-
ticipation is higher in Sweden (and in Denmark) than in the US and the 
UK. This suggests that a divorce in Sweden (or Denmark) would not 
necessarily imply as great changes for women as in the other two coun-
tries (for example, having to enter the labour market following a di-
vorce). In addition, the social security system, which includes, for ex-
ample, parental leave benefits, unemployment benefits and social assis-
tance is considered to be more generous in Sweden (and in Denmark) 
than in the US and in the UK. The public child care system is also more 
developed. This implies that a woman may not be as dependent on her 
ex-husband following a divorce as in the other two countries. The com-
bined facts that the Swedish studies are not very up to date, that they do 
not include any information on unanticipated changes in economic con-
ditions and that Sweden is a country that differs from some of the other 
studied countries in several respects makes it important to further inves-
tigate the Swedish family formation and dissolution patterns.  
 
The data used in this paper originates from Statistics Sweden, the Na-
tional Service Administration and the Swedish Employment Service. 
The study is based on a sub sample of individuals born in 1973 who, 
during the time period 1991-2003, committed to another individual born 
in the same year, a total of 3 392 couples. Commitment is defined as co-
habiting with children or being married with or without children. The 
dataset is unique in the sense that it contains information on results from 
cognitive and non-cognitive evaluations for almost all the male subjects, Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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who were Swedish citizens, the year they turned 18. This means that it is 
possible to observe some characteristics of the males, which their part-
ners are likely to observe prior to commitment, in a way that has not 
been done before.  
 
Financial surprises are defined in two ways. First, following Svarer 
(2005), the effects of short term deviations between predicted and ob-
served earnings are analysed. Earnings
1 in each year are predicted based 
on information for the previous year. The predictions are then compared 
to the observed value. Second, following Weiss and Willis (1997), the 
effects of unanticipated changes in long-run earnings capacity are ana-
lysed. Here, the earnings at the end of the observation period are used to 
represent the long-run earnings capacity. For each year, predictions of 
the long-run earnings capacity are made based on the information avail-
able at that point in time. These predictions are then compared with the 
initial prediction made at the time when the commitment was formed. 
The effects of match quality and short as well as long-run financial sur-
prises on commitment dissolution are then analysed using a probit 
model.  
 
The paper is outlined as follows. In section two, the theory underlying 
the role of financial surprises in commitments is explained. Section three 
gives a description of the data. In section four the empirical strategy is 
outlined, and in section five the estimation results are presented and ana-
lysed. Conclusions are given in section six.  
 
2  Commitment and the Role of Financial Surprises 
 
How is it possible that a union, which was optimal to enter at one point 
in time, may become optimal to leave at another point in time? One way 
to explain this phenomenon is to assume that the utility obtained by an 
individual from being in a relationship with another person is given by:  
  
  ) , ij ij j i
C C
i K     , X   , (X U U θ =   (1) 
 
where i X  represents personal characteristics and  j X  those of the part-
ner.  ij θ  includes unobservable characteristics specific to the commit-
ment, such as love and other aspects of match quality.  ij K  includes 
commitment capital accumulated during the relationship, but which is 
not specific to the commitment itself, for instance the quality and quan-
                                                 
1 Earnings are defined as gross income and include both labour and non labour income. Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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tity of children. All in all, the above means that the utility obtained by 
the individual from being in a commitment depends both on material 
and emotional factors.  
 
Outside of the relationship, each partner has the alternative of living as a 
single person, or to remarry. This means that the value of the outside al-
ternative can be specified as:  
 




i K   U E   , (X U U =   (2) 
 
where  ] [
new
i U E  is the expected gain from a (possible) future commit-
ment that includes the characteristics of the future partner, the match 
quality of the new commitment, and the expected future commitment 
capital.  ij K  is the part of the commitment capital that remains from a 
previous relationship. This may affect the utility from being single but it 
may also affect the chances of recommitment as well as the utility gain 
of a future commitment.  
 
Divorce occurs whenever one or both of the partners find that the utility 
of staying in the relationship is exceeded by the value of the outside al-
ternative. Within economic theory, there are two general explanations 
for this phenomenon (Becker et al. 1977). The first explanation has to do 
with match quality and the possibility of meeting a superior match. If 
searching for a partner is costly; then people are likely to search for a 
shorter time than they might otherwise have done. Accordingly, people 
who marry early are more likely to have made a relatively poor match, 
which decreases the value measured by equation (1). Further, encounters 
occur at random, which means that one day you might simply meet 
someone who suits you better. This would then increase the value of the 
outside alternative given by (2). The second explanation has to do with 
the possibility that, given the quality of the match, the gains from mar-
riage can change unexpectedly over time. This means that there could be 
a deviation between the actual and the predicted satisfaction from the re-
lationship decreasing the value measured by (1), which, in turn, could 
trigger divorce. Weiss and Willis (1997), Burdett and Coles (1998), and 
Svarer (2005) argue that the reasons behind the dissolution of a marriage 
are that the choice to enter a relationship is based upon the information 
available about the partner’s characteristics at the time that the commit-
ment starts, together with predictions made about unknown characteris-
tics, on the basis of the known information. This information is likely to 
be limited at the start, but as the relationship evolves, both partners ac-
quire new information about each other.  
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In view of the fact that the partners, to some extent, are matched into the 
commitment based on predictions, deviations between predictions and 
what is later actually observed can lead to dissolution of the relationship. 
It is also likely that couples with a low match quality are more sensitive 
to surprises, both negative and positive. In addition, it is also possible 
that in the beginning of the relationship, when the information that the 
partners have about each other is limited, they are more sensitive (i.e. 
they react stronger) to negative surprises than later on when they have 
gathered more experience and the stock of information is larger (Svarer 
2005). It is, therefore, likely that the probability of dissolution decreases 
the better the quality of match as well as the longer the duration of the 
commitment.  
 
As the commitment evolves, the partners are more prone to increase 
their investments in it. For example they add to the stock of information 
they have about their partner, they could have children and acquire 
property together. These investments increase the gains from staying in 
the commitment i.e. they increase the value of the relationship given by 
(1). The investment in commitment capital would, therefore, decrease 
the probability of the break up of the marriage.  
 
The above leads to the conclusion that earnings could have several im-
plications for the stability of a commitment. This is because, as long as 
there is some degree of income pooling, it is likely that having a high in-
come partner would increase the value of the commitment for the other 
person, through (1), which would work towards a more stable commit-
ment. On the other hand, a higher income potential increases the value 
of outside alternatives (i.e. increases the utility of being single and the 
possibility of meeting a match of higher quality who accepts you), 
which, in turn, decreases the stability of the commitment. In addition, 
the effects of financial surprises experienced by both spouses may inter-
act. This means that financial surprises in the form of deviations be-
tween expected and observed income will have an ambiguous effect and 
could influence the outcome of the commitment in either way, regard-
less of which of the partners is exposed to the surprise.  
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3 Data   
 
The empirical study is based on data from the LOUISE part of the 
LISA-database along with compulsory and upper secondary school
2 
graduation registers obtained from Statistics Sweden. The LISA-
database is longitudinal and contains yearly observations on civil status, 
education, income and labour force participation for all Swedes aged be-
tween sixteen and sixty four. The graduation registers contain informa-
tion about grade point average from compulsory and upper secondary 
school and the chosen academic track in upper secondary school. In ad-
dition, the data contain information on results from the evaluation of 
cognitive and non-cognitive traits obtained from the National Service 
Administration which is responsible for enrolling and administering 
those eligible for military service. The evaluations are subjected to vir-
tually all males who are Swedish citizens the year they turn 18. 
 
The sample comes from a cohort of 110 000 individuals born in 1973 
and registered in Sweden on December 31, 1990. The individuals were 
followed between the years 1990 and 2003. The purpose of this paper is 
to study matching into commitment and the effect of financial surprises 
on commitment dissolution. However, as the data is register based, in-
formation about partners is not available for all individuals included in 
the data. Therefore, the study is limited to a sub sample were partners 
could be identified, i.e. those who were born in 1973 and committed to a 
partner also was also born in 1973 during the time period 1991-2002. As 
it is not possible to isolate cohabitation prior to having children, couples 
cohabiting with children as well as married couples, with or without 
children, are regarded as committed. This leaves a sample consisting of 
3 392 couples. In the data, dissolution is only observed annually, mean-
ing that relationship break up could have occurred at any time during a 
given year.  
 
Table 1 gives the survival pattern for commitments in this sample. Judg-
ing by the table, the probability of dissolving a commitment early (after 
entering it) is lower if the commitment starts later during the observation 
period, i.e. when the couple is older.  
 
                                                 
2 The Swedish public school system consists of nine years of compulsory schooling. After 
that, students can continue on to two or three years of non compulsory schooling in the 
form of upper secondary school. Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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Table 1. Survival Frequency by Commitment Year  
  Year for Start of Commitment 
Dur.  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
    0  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
    1  0.67 0.93 0.86 0.89 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
    2  0.52 0.76 0.77 0.82 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95  
    3  0.48 0.63 0.70 0.74 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.93    
    4  0.38 0.61 0.59 0.70 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.89 0.90      
    5  0.33 0.59 0.51 0.67 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.86        
    6  0.24 0.52 0.47 0.64 0.72 0.75 0.79          
    7  0.24 0.48 0.45 0.59 0.70 0.72            
    8  0.14  0.48  0.42  0.56  0.65         
    9  0.14  0.41  0.38  0.53          
    10  0.14  0.41  0.37           
    11  0.14  0.37            
    12  0.14             
N  21  46  110 174 220 246 283 334 416 496 504 542 
 
In Table 2, descriptive statistics for the individual-specific explanatory 
variables are given. For time varying variables, the descriptive statistics 
are measured the year before divorce for divorcing couples, and the year 
before the observation period ends for couples who remain committed 
throughout the period of observation, which makes it hard to directly 
compare the means of the variables over relationship outcome. As can 
be seen in the table, women whose commitment ends in dissolution, 
have a higher degree of unemployment, they have lower grades from 
both compulsory and upper secondary school, and a higher portion of 
these women were born outside of Sweden. It also looks as though these 
women have lower earnings and are less well educated. This is, how-
ever, likely to be due to the discrepancy in years of measurement. The 
pattern is repeated for males. It is also clear from Table 2 that males in a 
commitment that ends in dissolution during the observed period of time 
have lower scores on their military service evaluations than those whose 
commitment remains intact during the observed period of time.  
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Table 2. Means (SD) of Individual-Specific Variables by Commitment 
Outcome 
 
Variable Name  Continuingt  Dissolvingt 
Labour Market    
  Earningst-1, Females 
150.64  
 (83.012) 
91.05   
( 73.87) 





  Days in Unemployment t-1,    
  Females 
41.45  
 (95.34) 
102.41   
(126.60) 
  Days in Unemployment t-1,  
  Males 
21.69   
(70.08) 
113.34   
(193.02) 
Education Females    
  Compulsory Schoolt-1   0.05 0.25 
  Vocational Trainingt-1   0.21 0.35 
  Theoretical Educationt-1  0.26 0.24 
  University Shortt-1  0.15 0.08 
  University Longt-1   0.33 0.09 
  Compulsory School GPA  3.38 2.89 
  Secondary School GPA  3.37 3.07 
Education Males    
  Compulsory Schoolt-1   0.08 0.26 
  Vocational Trainingt-1   0.30 0.38 
  Theoretical Educationt-1  0.23 0.22 
  University Shortt-1  0.13 0.09 
  University Longt-1   0.24 0.06 
  Compulsory School GPA  3.16 2.74 
  Secondary School GPA  3.28 3.02 
Ethnicity Females     
  Sweden  0.97 0.93 
  Other  0.03 0.07 
Ethnicity Males    
  Sweden  0.97 0.94 
  Other  0.03 0.06 
Military Service Variables (Males)    
  Command adequacy  5.62 4.91 
  Evaluation of Non-Cognitive  
  Traits 
5.47 4.50 
  Test of Cognitive Traits  5.16 4.33 
Number of Couples  2 831  561 
 
Note: Earnings are annual earnings, in the price level for the year 2000, expressed in thou-
sands of SEK. Education is measured as the highest level achieved in each year. 
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In Table 3, descriptive statistics for couple specific explanatory vari-
ables are given. Couples who break up have more children than those 
who stay together. They are also more often of different ethnic back-
grounds and are more frequently receipt of social assistance. The degree 
of difference in the level of education between partners is, however, 
about the same in dissolving commitments as in those that continue. 
From Table 1 it can be seen that commitments that start early during the 
observation period i.e. when the couple is young, have a higher prob-
ability of dissolution. One might suspect that the commitments that last 
throughout the observation period simply do so because they have not 
had enough time to end. However, as observed in Table 3, the relation-
ships that dissolve consistently have shorter commitment duration.  
 
Table 3. Means (SD) of Couple-Specific Variables by Commitment 
Outcome 
 
Variable Name  Continuingt  Dissolvingt 
Couple Characteristics    














  Different Ethnicity  0.05 0.09 
  Different Levels of Educationt-1  0.61 0.63   
  Living in Cityt-1   0.41 0.41 
  Social Assistance Recipients  0.01 0.23 
Number of Couples  2831 561 
 
Note: The variable Different ethnicity takes the value one if the partners were born in dif-
ferent countries; the variable Different level of education takes the value one if the level of 
education differs between the partners 
 
4 Empirical  Strategy 
 
In this section, the empirical strategy is described. The first step involves 
determining measures of financial surprises. Financial surprises are de-
fined in two ways. First, short term deviations between predicted and 
observed earnings are specified and, second, unanticipated changes in 
long-run earning capacity are defined.  
  
Svarer (2005) considers short run deviations between expected and real-
ized earnings. In his paper, expected earnings are estimated by OLS, 
where earnings are regressed on education, age, number of children, 
geographical location, number of sickness days and number of days in Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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unemployment in each year. The expected earnings are then subtracted 
from the observed earnings to determine whether there is a positive or a 
negative deviation. In the present paper, the earnings equation for short 




02 , , 91 , 90 t for




1 t , i
K =
+ + − + + = + + ω γ δ β α
   (3) 
 
where  i z  is a time invariant vector of background variables for individ-
ual i , which includes GPA for females and military service evaluations 
for males, ethnicity, parental income and parental education.
4 The vector 
t , i x  contains time varying explanatory variables. It includes information 
about education
5, number of days in unemployment, geographical loca-
tion, the number of children and civil status.  t , i Y log  is the log of ob-
served earnings at time t.  t , i d  is a dummy indicating zero earnings. It 
means that if the income is zero, then  1 d t , i =  and ( ) 0 d 1 t , i = −  and the 
effect is instead captured by the parameter t γ .
6 The error term is denoted 
1 t , i + ω  and contains the part of individual i’s earnings at time t+1 that 
cannot be explained by information available in t. The earnings equation 
is estimated using OLS with the White estimator of the variance-
covariance matrix to account for heteroscedasticity
7. At time t, the ex-
pected value of the error term is zero, meaning that the expected earn-
ings,  1 t , i Y ˆ log + , can be predicted by using (3).  
 
One of the main interests in this paper is the effect of financial surprises 
on the probability of the dissolution of a relationship. After predicting 
earnings, deviations between predicted and observed earnings can be 
                                                 
3 The difference between this approach and the traditional Mincer equation is that the ap-
proach adopted here includes information on observed earnings along with background in-
formation on the subjects, which increases the precision of the predictions.  
4 Parental income was measured in the years 1990, 1991 and 1992. The mean income for 
these years was calculated and the parents were divided into high income, mid income and 
low income parents. Parents that were within two thirds of a standard deviation from the 
mean were defined as mid income parents. The educational level of parents was measured 
at the same three points in time, and divided into compulsory school, upper secondary 
school and university education.   
5 As this first step of the empirical study involves prediction of earnings, the education 
levels will be included as they are presented in Table 2.   
6 This construction is used, as it allows for the possibility that there is a difference between 
having zero earnings and having low earnings. Weiss and Willis (1997) use the same type 
of construction. 
7 Se for example Green (2000). Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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calculated. However, it is likely that a deviation has to be of a certain 
magnitude for the partner to perceive it as a surprise. In this paper, the 
predicted value has to differ from the observed value by 20 percent or 
more
8 to qualify as a surprise. To allow for the possibility that a positive 
surprise has a different effect than a negative surprise on the dissolution 
of the commitment, two separate surprise variables will be included in 
the analysis. The surprise variables are defined as:  
 




t , i t , i ≥
−
 




t , i t , i − ≤
−
 
  for t =1, 2, …,T 
 
If the deviation between observed and predicted earnings meets the 
above criteria i.e. exceeds 20 percent it is included as the deviation in 
SEK, and if it does not meet the criteria it is included as a zero. Interac-
tion dummies between surprises in female and male earnings will also 
be used, for instance a dummy is included that takes the value one if 
both partners experience a positive surprise. The co-variation
9 between 
observed and predicted short run earnings is displayed in Table 4, to-
gether with descriptive statistics of surprises.  
 
Table 4. Surprises in Short Term Earnings 
 
  Mean (SD)  N  % 
Females      
  Positive Surprise in SEK  75.57      (49.71)    9377  72 
  Negative Surprise in SEK  90.90      (109.66)  2148  17 
  Co-Variation between Observed 
  and Predicted Earnings  0.36   12891   
Males        
  Positive Surprise in SEK  94.84      (68.01)    6461  50 
  Negative Surprise in SEK  91.00      (90.89)    2467  19 
  Co-Variation between Observed 
  and Predicted Earnings  0.53   12891   
 
                                                 
8 Limits between 10 and 30 percent have been tried. However, the results do not seem to 
be sensitive to the choice of cut-off.  
9 The co-variation is the percentage of observed earnings in each year described by the 
predictions. Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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Weiss and Willis (1997) evaluate the effects of unanticipated changes in 
the predicted long-run earnings capacity on the probability of divorce, 
by considering the difference between predicted earnings at time t  and 
the initial prediction made at the time of marriage. Earnings are pre-
dicted based upon work history, years of schooling and highest degree 
attained together with variables describing family background and per-
sonal characteristics. Following Weiss and Willis, the earnings for the 
last year of observation, here 2003, are assumed to be representative of 
the long-run earnings capacity of the partners and are, therefore, used to 
construct a prediction scheme to recursively estimate the long-run earn-
ings capacity for each individual. As a first step, the following equation 
is estimated:  
 
  ( )
03








i Y log  is the observed long-run earnings capacity. The other 
variables are the same as those included in the short run predictions. The 
parameters from (4) are then used to predict 
03
91 , i Y ˆ log , which is the pre-
diction of the long-run earnings capacity made in 1991. In a second step, 
predictions about long-run earnings capacity are made for each subse-
quent year. In order to incorporate past information, the prediction about 
the long-run earnings capacity made the previous year is included as an 
explanatory variable in the estimation of the long-run earnings capacity 
in yeart ;  
 
  ( )
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1 t , i Y ˆ log −  is the prediction of long-run earnings capacity made for 
the preceding year.  t , i x  contains any new information available about 
education, level of unemployment, geographical location, number of 
children and civil status. Co-variation between the observed long-run 
earnings capacity and the predictions made each year, for each gender, is 
given in Table 5. The first row of the table is drawn from the baseline 
regression specified in (4), and the other rows are from the recursive re-
gressions specified in (5).  
 
As can be seen from Table 5, the early predictions are not very precise, 
even though a considerable amount of information about the individuals 
is available. The predictions are better for males than for females: earn-
ings for males are usually easier to predict, but one additional explana-Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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tion is that more information is available on males because of the Mili-
tary Service variables.  
 
Table 5. Co-Variation between Predicted and Observed Values of Long-
Run Earnings Capacity 
 
  Co-Variation 
Year  Females Males 
1991 0.05  0.09 
1992 0.07  0.10 
1993 0.08  0.10 
1994 0.09  0.11 
1995 0.10  0.12 
1996 0.10  0.13 
1997 0.11  0.14 
1998 0.13  0.16 
1999 0.15  0.18 
2000 0.19  0.24 
2001 0.23  0.30 
2002 0.32  0.47 
 
After the long-run earning capacity has been estimated, the prediction 
made each year during the commitment is compared with the prediction 
made at the beginning of the commitment. The same definition of a sur-
prise as before applies, i.e. the deviation has to be larger than 20 percent 
in order to count as a surprise. This gives the surprise variables as:  
 
      Positive surprisei,t in SEK if  20 . 0
Y ˆ






t , i ≥
−
 
      Negative surprisei,t in SEK if  20 . 0
Y ˆ






t , i − ≤
−
 
  for t =2, 3, …,T 
 
Surprise variables are included in three different ways. First, in resem-
blance with Weiss and Willis (1997), a surprise in earnings of each part-
ner is included as a single variable (without being separated into positive 
and negative surprises), together with the squared deviation from the 
mean surprise. This is done in order to make comparisons easier. Sec-
ond, positive and negative surprises are included as two separate vari-
ables for each partner. Finally, in a third stage interaction dummies be-
tween surprises in female and male earnings are included. In Table 6, 
descriptive statistics of surprises in predicted long-run earnings capacity 
are given. Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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Table 6. Surprises in long-run earnings capacity  
 
  Mean    (SD)   N  % 
Females      
  Positive Surprise in SEK  52.56      (31.66)    2466  19 
  Negative Surprise in SEK  44.59      (33.10)  2197  17 
Males        
  Positive Surprise in SEK  96.88     (133.88)    2773  21 
  Negative Surprise in SEK  77.88      (60.49)    1521  12 
 
A potential problem when analyzing the determinants of the dissolution 
of relationships is that certain individual characteristics are (at least in 
part) formed during the commitment period and, therefore, not exoge-
nous. This could, for example, be true for earnings as it is possible that a 
woman, who experiences a decline in the quality of the commitment, 
may change her labour market activities when considering a divorce, i.e. 
increase her labour market participation. Weiss and Willis (1997) make 
an attempt to deal with this possible endogeneity by including a variable 
concerning the reported happiness of the marriage for their respondents. 
However, it is not entirely clear how a measure that is reported after the 
divorce would eliminate (or reduce) this possible endogeneity. It is 
likely that the problem of women changing their labour market activities 
prior to divorce is much smaller among young women in Sweden during 
the 1990’s than it was in the US during the 1970’s, simply because 
young Swedish women participate in the labour market to a greater ex-
tent regardless of civil status. The same is true for Danish women of to-
day, and Svarer (2005) does not deal with this possible issue either.  
 
In each period of time, an individual will stay in the commitment if the 
utility from the commitment exceeds the value of outside alternatives. 
Dissolution can be initiated by either of the partners, and it does not 
have to be a joint decision to separate. Following the notation used by 
Fan and Lui (2004), this means that either partner will choose to dis-










0 commitment from Utility E
e alternativ outside of Value E D
1 t j,
1 t j, t j,
  (6) 
 
D is unobservable, but it is possible to observe a proxy indicator  * I  for 
continuing the commitment or dissolving it. The empirical analysis is 
based on a probit model where  1 * I = , if  0 Dfemale >  and/or  0 Dmale > , 
meaing that dissolution occurs, whereas  0 * I =  otherwise, meaning that Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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the commitment remains intact. As was previously stated, dissolution is 
only observed on a yearly basis. Accordingly, explanatory variables at 
time t-1 are used to explain the probability of divorce in period t. This is 
done to avoid the possible influence of the dissolution event on the value 
of any of the variables of interest. In order to control for possible non-
independence of observations over time, the standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering on couples.
10  
 
The economic theory about partnership dissolution suggests that couples 
with a low match quality are more sensitive to surprises, and that the 
quality of the match is likely to increase the greater amount of time 
spent on the search for a partner. Couples who met at a younger age 
should, therefore, be faced with a higher probability of dissolution when 
surprises occur. The theory also implies that early on in a relationship, 
when the information partners have about each other is limited, they are 
likely to be more sensitive to surprises. Accordingly, when analysing the 
effects of surprises in short run earnings and surprises in long-run earn-
ings capacity, some additional interactions will be included. This is done 
in order to investigate whether a low match quality due to the young age 
of the couple at the start of the relationship makes the relationship more 
sensitive to surprises; and whether couples are more sensitive to sur-





In this section, the empirical results from the probit model in (6) are pre-
sented and analysed. The first subsection deals with the results from the 
probit estimation of dissolution, with surprises in short term earnings 
from (3). The second subsection discusses the results from the probit es-
timation with surprises in predicted long-run earnings capacity from (4) 
and (5). In both subsections, in order to analyse whether couples with 
low match quality and/or low information are more sensitive to sur-
prises, financial surprises are interacted with the age at the start of the 
relationship. 
  
5.1  Surprises in Short Term Earnings 
The results of the probit estimation with surprises in short run earnings 
are given in Table 7. Column one gives the estimates of the model with-
out interaction terms for the “surprise variables”. In the second column, 
interaction terms are included.  
 
                                                 
10 See for example Böheim and Ermisch (2001). Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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Table 7. Probit Model of Commitment Dissolution with Financial Sur-
prises in Short Term Earnings 
 
  Column 






Couple Characteristics    
  Year for Start of Commitment  -0.030***   
(0.011) 
-0.031***   
(0.011) 
  Log Duration of Commitment  0.038    
(0.044) 
0.037    
(0.044) 
  Number of Children  0.009   
 (0.043) 
0.007    
(0.043) 
  One Child < 3 Years Old  -0.015   
(0.061) 
-0.015    
 (0.060) 
  More than One Child < 3 Years 
  Old 
-0.183**   
 (0.090) 
-0.181*    
(0.092) 
  Different Levels of Education 
0.106** 
 (0.046) 
0.107**    
(0.046) 
  Different Ethnicity  0.163    
(0.130) 
0.168     
(0.131)      
  Living in City  0.136***   
(0.043)      
0.136***   
 (0.043) 
  Social Assistance Recipients  0.479***   
(0.072)     
0.483*** 
(0.072) 
Labour Market    
  Earnings, Female  -0.002***   
(0.0005)     
-0.002***   
(0.0005) 
  Squared Deviation from Mean, 





  Earnings, Male 
-0.001***   
(0.0003) 
-0.001***   
(0.0003) 
  Squared Deviation from Mean, 
  Male 




  Days in Unemployment, Female  -0.0002   
 (0.0002) 
-0.0002    
(0.0002) 
  Days in Unemployment, Male  0.0003   
 (0.0002) 
0.0003    
(0.0002) 
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Table 7. Continued 
 
Financial Surprises    
  Positive Surprise, Female  0.003***   
(0.0006)      
0.003***  
(0.0006) 
  Negative Surprise, Female  0.0006    
(0.0006)      
0.0005   
(0.0006) 
  Positive Surprise, Male  0.0006*   
(0.0003)      
0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
  Negative Surprise, Male  -0.0005   
 (0.0005)     
-0.0007    
(0.0007) 
  Female Pos. Surprise /  
  Male Pos. Surprise    -0.155**   
(0.070) 
  Female Pos. Surprise /  
  Male Neg. Surprise    -0.004    
(0.087) 
  Female Neg. Surprise /  
  Male Neg. Surprise    -0.100    
(0.155) 
  Female Neg. Surprise /  
  Male Pos. Surprise    -0.096   
 (0.100) 
Ethnicity     




  Born Outside of Sweden, Male  -0.219*    
(0.127)     
-0.231*    
(0.127) 
Education Female / Male    
  Basic / Basic   0.205***   
(0.073)     
0.206***   
 (0.072) 
  University / Basic  0.002   
 (0.094)      
0.004   
(0.094) 
  Basic / University   0.095   
 (0.102) 
0.090    
(0.102) 
  Constant  58.215***   
(21.987)     
59.808***   
(22.116) 
Model Information    





  Pseudo R
2 0.078  0.079 
  Log Pseudo-Likelihood  -2127.737  -2124.626 
N (Couple Years)  12891 12891 
 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** Statistically significant at the 5 
percent level, *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
 
As can be seen from Table 7, the probability of dissolution is lower for 
commitments that started late in the sample period than for ones that 
started earlier, ceteris paribus. Because the respondents are all the same Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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age, this result is equivalent to the probability of dissolution decreasing 
the older the spouses are at the start of the commitment. This result is in 
line with the findings of Weiss and Willis (1997), and Böheim and Er-
misch (2001), and it supports the hypothesis that the quality of a match 
increases with the time spent on searching for a partner. Another expla-
nation is that people who meet early are less mature than those who 
meet later and/or that they diverge in their continued individual devel-
opment (see, for example, Hoem and Hoem 1992). The probability of 
dissolution does not seem to be related to the duration of the commit-
ment. Hence, there is no support for the theory that the gains from the 
commitment increase the greater the length of the commitment.  
 
The presence of more than one young child tends to decrease the prob-
ability of dissolution, but the probability is not affected by having only 
one young child or by the number of children. Having more than one 
child aged under three is likely to imply that, at least, one child is very 
young. Weiss and Willis (1997) argue that fertility decisions could be 
one type of decision that is endogenous in the decision to discontinue 
the commitment. Other researchers, such as Lillard (1993), have tested 
this explicitly and found that there is a negative correlation between the 
two decisions. However, in spite of this, Lillard still finds the first child 
born to couples to have a stabilizing effect on the relationship. This is in 
line with the theory of investment in commitment capital.  
 
Having different ethnical backgrounds does not seem to affect the stabil-
ity of the commitment, indeed relationships where the male was born in 
another country are more stable. The latter finding may be related to cul-
ture or religion. If the male is born abroad, his attitude to divorce might 
be different than that of Swedish born males. This would, in turn, imply 
a higher disutility from leaving a relationship i.e. a higher value of eq. 
(1). Living in a city increases the probability of dissolution. One expla-
nation is that more alternative matches are available in the big cities. 
The latter result is in line with findings by Svarer (2002, 2004, 2005).  
 
If the partners have different levels of education
11, this has a destabiliz-
ing effect on the commitment. In addition, the educational level itself 
seems to be of some importance. If both partners have only compulsory 
school or upper secondary school education, the relationship has a 
higher probability of dissolution than if both have at least some univer-
                                                 
11 Here, compulsory school, vocational training and theoretical education are added into 
the variable basic education and long and short university education are added into univer-
sity education. The variable “different level of education” in Table 3 is included to account 
for differences within groups.  
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sity education. These results are confirmed in many other studies of 
marital break ups, see, for example, Georgellis (1996).  
 
The probability of dissolution decreases the higher female and male 
earnings. The stabilizing effects confirm the idea that the gains from a 
commitment increases the greater the earnings. This is also confirmed 
by other studies, e.g. Hoffman and Duncan (1995) found that increases 
in the husband’s earnings and the wife’s wage rate reduced the probabil-
ity of divorce. Table 7 shows that the effect for female earnings is linear, 
while the effect of male earnings is significantly nonlinear in the first 
model but not in the second. 
 
Although unemployment does not affect the probability of divorce, the 
probability for a break up of the relationship increases if the couple is 
receiving social assistance. These variables could be classified as repre-
senting negative surprises, or unexpected events. Svarer (2002) argues 
that it is unfortunate if the probability of dissolution increases with these 
types of variables, as the theory developed by Weiss and Willis (1997) 
suggests that risk sharing is one of the advantages of being in a com-
mitment. This is because one partner could provide insurance for the 
other in a time of bad surprises. Here, it seems as though partners do in-
deed provide insurance in the case of unemployment, but that the insur-
ance motive becomes weaker in really bad times, i.e. when a couple is in 
need of social assistance. However, it is unlikely that the effect captured 
by the social assistance parameter is due to the fact that the couple is re-
ceiving social assistance, but rather that there are probably other factors 
behind being on social assistance that have a negative influence on the 
relationship. Accordingly, this result does not by necessity imply that 
risk sharing is not effective.  
 
Positive financial surprises, calculated as the difference between the ob-
served and the predicted earnings each year, affect the stability of the 
commitment. This can be seen in column one. A positive surprise is as-
sociated with a less stable relationship, regardless of gender. Svarer 
(2005) found that deviations between expected and observed earnings 
affected the probability of divorce. For woman, he found that deviations 
in either direction increased the divorce rate. However, for men, he 
found that positive deviations had a stabilizing effect on the marriage 
whereas negative deviations were destabilizing. The findings here are 
quite different from those of Svarer, particularly for males.  
 
In column two, interaction dummies are included to control for the pos-
sibility that a deviation in the expected earnings of one partner could 
have different effects depending on the deviations in expected earnings Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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of the other. The introduction of interaction dummies does not change 
the results of the original model in column one. Positive surprises in fe-
male or male earnings are still destabilizing, as long as both partners do 
not experience positive surprises at the same time. In this case, the effect 
is, instead, the opposite. Judging by the theory outlined in section 2, a 
positive surprise in earnings for either partner seems to increase the 
value of his or her outside alternatives, which, in turn, increases the 
probability of separation. However, if both experience a positive sur-
prise at the same time, it seems as if the gains from staying in the com-
mitment outweigh the effect of a higher value in an outside alternative. 
 
Even though the probability of dissolution decreases the older the 
spouses are at the start of the relationship, the data show no support for 
the idea that couples meeting earlier would be more sensitive to sur-
prises in short run earnings. The inclusion of interactions between age at 
the start of the relationship and financial surprises shows no significant 
results. These interactions are, therefore, not presented. However, there 
is some evidence that the sensitivity to surprises is dependent on the du-
ration of the commitment. The results of the interaction terms, where fi-
nancial surprises are interacted with the duration of the commitment, are 
given in Table A1 in Appendix A.  
 
A positive surprise in female earnings is still associated with an in-
creased probability of divorce, regardless of the duration of the relation-
ship. There is a stabilizing effect from negative surprises in male earn-
ings, but this stabilizing effect is reduces the longer the duration of the 
relationship. In addition, there is a destabilizing effect from a positive 
surprise in male earnings that increases nonlinearly with duration. In-
stead of giving evidence of couples being more sensitive to surprises 
early in the relationship when the stock of information is low, these re-
sults suggest the opposite. When couples have been together longer and 
a financial surprise occurs, they seem more likely to dissolve the rela-
tionship. One explanation could be that couples that have been together 
longer are more likely to have made large investments in commitment 
specific capital and could, therefore, be more dependent on the expected 
income of his or her spouse. Another explanation could be that from the 
beginning, when you are madly in love, you might be more indulgent if 
your partner does not measure up to your expectations. 
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  21
5.2  Surprises in Predicted Long-run Earnings Capacity 
The results of the probit estimation with surprises in long-run earnings 
capacity are given in Table 8. The model in the first column resembles 
the model estimated by Weiss and Willis (1997), while the model in the 
second column includes deviations separated into negative or positive 
surprises in the same way as was done in the previous section. The third 
column includes interaction variables for surprises in predicted long-run 
earnings capacity.  
 
Table 8. Probit Model of Commitment Dissolution with Deviations in 
Long-Run Earnings Capacity  
 
  Column 








Couple Characteristics      
  Year for Start of Commitment  -0.033***   
(0.011)     
-0.032***   
(0.011) 
-0.031***   
(0.011) 
  Log Duration of Commitment  0.040    
(0.044) 
0.045    
(0.048) 
0.052    
(0.049) 
  Number of Children  -0.009    
(0.045) 
-0.011   
(0.046) 
-0.011    
(0.046) 
  One Child < 3 Years Old  0.005  
 (0.061) 
0.002    
(0.061) 
-0.002     
(0.061) 
  More than One Child < 3 Years 
  Old  
-0.135    
(0.096) 
-0.136    
(0.098)   
-0.139    
(0.098) 
  Different Ethnicity  0.217    
(0.134) 
0.214   
 (0.135) 
0.211     
(0.134) 
  Different Levels of Education  0.107**    
(0.045) 
0.108**   
 (0.045) 
0.105**   
(0.045) 
  Living in City  0.111***   
(0.043) 




  Social Assistance Recipients  0.381***   
(0.078) 
0.372***   
(0.077) 
0.386***   
(0.078) 
Labour Market     
  Predicted Earnings at Time of  
  Commitment,  Female 
-0.002***  
(0.0006) 
-0.002***   
(0.0005)     
-0.002***   
(0.0006) 
  Predicted Earnings at Time of  
  Commitment,  Male 
-0.001***   
(0.0003) 
-0.002***   
(0.0003) 
-0.001***   
(0.0003) 
  Days in Unemployment, female  -0.0001   
(0.0002) 
-0.00007   
(0.0002)    
-0.0001   
(0.0001) 
  Days in Unemployment, Male  0.0005**   
(0.0002) 
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Table 8. Continued 
 
Financial Surprises     
  Surprise, Female  0.0001   
(0.0001)        
  Squared Surprise, Female  -0.00002*   
(0.00001)    
  Surprise, Male  -0.00002   
(0.00005)    
  Squared Surprise, Male  0.00000003  
(0.0000001)    
  Deviation, Female * Male  -0.00001   
(0.00001)    
  Positive Surprise, Female    -0.002***   
(0.001) 
-0.001   
 (0.001) 
  Negative Surprise, Female    -0.002    
(0.001) 
-0.002    
(0.001) 
  Positive Surprise, Male    -0.00001   
(0.0006) 
-0.0001   
(0.001) 




  Female Pos. Surprise /  
  Male Pos. Surprise     -0.0001   
(0.001) 
  Female Pos. Surprise /  
  Male Neg. Surprise     -0.232*   
(0.115) 
  Female Neg. Surprise /  
  Male Neg. Surprise     -0.131    
(0.113) 
  Female Neg. Surprise /  
  Male Pos. Surprise     -0.011     
(0.101) 
Ethnicity      
  Born outside of Sweden, female  0.038    
(0.131) 
0.038   
(0.131) 
0.041   
 (0.130) 
  Born outside of Sweden, male  -0.309**    
(0.132) 
-0.309**   
(0.132) 
-0.307**   
(0.132) 
Education at time of commitment 
Female / Male     
  Basic / Basic  0.055 
(0.081) 
0.062    
(0.081) 
0.059     
0.081) 
  University / Basic 
0.036   
 (0.108) 
0.039   
 (0.107) 
0.039     
(0.107) 
  Basic / University 
-0.107    
(0.100) 
-0.103    
(0.100) 
-0.102    
(0.100) 
  Constant  65.078***  
(21.476)  
63.380***   
(21.553) 
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Table 8. Continued 
 
Model Information     






  Pseudo R
2  0.078 0.078 0.079 
  Log pseudo-likelihood  -2125.976  -2126.669  -2124.951 
N (couple years)  12891 12891  12891 
 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** Statistically significant at the 5 
percent level, *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
 
In this analysis, the initial prediction of the long-run earnings capacity is 
used instead of the observed income of each individual. Higher predic-
tions about female and male long-run earnings capacity are, in both 
cases, associated with a decreasing divorce probability. Similar results 
are found by Weiss and Willis, and it seems as though individuals are 
matched into commitments based on their earnings capacity. Here, the 
educational level at the time when the partnership was formed is used 
instead of educational level during the time of the commitment. Con-
trary to the findings by Weiss and Willis, the educational level at the 
time of commitment does not seem to affect the stability of the relation-
ship. Having different levels of education is again found to be destabiliz-
ing.  
 
For males, being unemployed increases the probability of dissolution of 
the relationship, whereas the stability is not affected by female unem-
ployment. In other words, there is here some evidence contradicting the 
idea of the partner as an insurer in a time of negative surprises. At least, 
it seems as if women are less prone than men to provide this type of in-
surance. Families receiving social assistance are, again, found to be as-
sociated with a higher probability of divorce. 
 
Weiss and Willis found that an unanticipated increase in the husband’s 
earnings capacity tends to reduce the probability of divorce, while an 
unexpected increase in the wife’s earning capacity has the opposite ef-
fect. However, the latter result was not statistically significant. In the 
first column of Table 8, an approach similar to theirs has been used. The 
findings are that surprises in predicted long-run earnings capacity have 
no effect on the probability of divorce. Accordingly, there seems to be a 
difference between young Swedish individuals during the 1990’s and 
young Americans during the 1970’s and 80’s in this respect. 
 
In column two of Table 8, the financial surprises are divided into posi-
tive and negative surprises in order to allow for different impacts on the 
probability of dissolution (this separation of surprises differs from the Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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model used by Weiss and Willis). The results imply that positive sur-
prises in the predicted long-run earnings capacity for women decrease 
the probability of divorce. The explanation could be that the utility from 
staying in the commitment increases for males when their female partner 
experiences a positive surprise, and that this effect dominates the effect 
of the female wanting to leave the relationship due to a better outside al-
ternative.   
 
In column three, interaction dummies are introduced, and this gives 
some additional information about surprises in the long-run earnings ca-
pacity. The only interaction term that has a statistically significant effect 
on the probability of separation is when there is a positive surprise in 
expectations about female earnings at the same time as there is a nega-
tive surprise in expectations about male earnings. The coefficient is 
negative, meaning that these couples tend to stick together. The inclu-
sion of the interaction variables also changes the result of the original 
surprise variables in column two. The effect of positive female surprises 
is now insignificant, whereas, the coefficient for negative male surprises 
shows a destabilizing and significant effect. A possible explanation is 
that women who are able to change their labour market activities when 
their expectations about their partners’ long-run earnings capacity are 
decreasing actually do so. Another possibility is that these effects are the 
result of a deliberate choice that the couple has made, i.e. there is an 
agreement that the male should decrease his labour market activity in 
order for the female to be able to increase hers.  
 
Running a probit model with additional interaction terms gives no sup-
port for the theory that reactions to surprises in long-run earnings capac-
ity are sensitive to a low quality of match because of the couple’s young 
age at the start of the commitment or to a low stock of information due 
to the short duration period of the relationship. 
 
6  Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The two dominating theories of divorce are that a good quality of match 
is crucial for the stability of a marriage, and that deviations between the 
expected and the realised utility of a marriage can cause divorce. In this 
paper, the roles of financial surprises and the quality of match on disso-
lution of the relationship have been analysed. Financial surprises are de-
fined in two ways. First, following Svarer (2005) the effects of short 
term surprises, calculated as deviations between predicted and observed 
earnings, are analysed. Second, following Weiss and Willis (1997), the 
effects of surprises in long-run earnings capacity are analysed. The re-
sults show that unanticipated changes in economic circumstances do Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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have an influence on the stability of a relationship. Positive surprises in 
short term earnings, for either partner, are associated with an increasing 
probability of the break up of a relationship. If both partners experience 
a positive surprise at the same time, the effect is, instead, stabilizing. For 
surprises in long-run earnings capacity, an unexpected increase in the 
female earnings tends to reduce the probability of divorce when the male 
experiences a negative surprise. The experience of a negative surprise in 
male earnings has, itself, a destabilizing effect. No support is found for 
the idea that couples meeting earlier in their lives i.e. when they are 
younger are more sensitive to surprises in their earnings. There is, on the 
other hand, some evidence that surprises in short run earnings are corre-
lated with the duration of the commitment. 
 
Other findings are that the relationship becomes more stable if the part-
ners start their commitment at an older age, but that couples who live in 
a city are more likely to dissolve their relationship than others. The pres-
ence of very young children stabilizes the relationship, while there are 
no effects from the number of children. Higher income has a stabilizing 
effect, as does a higher educational level in some of the regressions. 
Negative shocks, i.e. unemployment for females, unemployment for 
males and having to receive social assistance, give results that are am-
biguous. It seems as if partners provide some insurance for each other in 
the case of unemployment, but that being on social assistance tends to 
increase the probability of dissolution.  
 
It has been shown in earlier empirical studies that the experience of a di-
vorce has negative effects on the labour market outcomes and on the 
performance in school of children affected by divorce (see for example 
Keith and Finlay, 1988), and as divorce has become more socially ac-
ceptable, further research within this field is called for. One interesting 
aspect would be to further investigate the correlation between financial 
surprises and the duration of the commitment, as some of the results pre-
sented here seem to contradict the underlying theory. Another aspect 
that would be interesting to analyse is the possible effects of the Swed-
ish maximum fee for child care reform, proposed in 2000 and imple-
mented in 2002, on the probability of dissolution. The reform meant that 
the charges for municipal child care were effectively lowered in most 
cases, which might, in turn, affected the divorce rate. Finally, since co-
habitation out of wedlock is increasingly common in Sweden nowadays, 
it would be interesting to analyse the effect of cohabitation on the prob-
ability of dissolving a relationship. The studies by Bennett et al. (1988), 
Hoem and Hoem (1992) and Trussell et al. (1992) all found that pre-
marital cohabitation increased the probability of dissolution for Swedish 
couples, while Svarer (2002, 2004 and 2005) found the opposite for Match Quality, Financial Surprises and… 
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Danish couples. Is there really a profound difference between the Swed-
ish and the Danish marriage markets, or is the difference simply due to 
the point in time at which the studies were conducted? 
  
 










  Positive surprise, female  0.003***    
(0.001) 
  Negative surprise, female  0.0004   
(0.0008) 
  Positive surprise, male  0.0006    
(0.0007)      
  Negative surprise, male  -0.003***   
(0.001) 
  Positive surprise, female  * Duration   0.0000004   
(0.0002)     
  Negative surprise, female * Duration      -0.0003    
(0.0005) 
  Positive surprise, male * Duration          0.0003*    
(0.0002) 
  Negative surprise, male * Duration      0.0008**    
(0.0004) 
  Positive surprise, female * Squared deviation    
  from mean duration        
0.00002    
(0.00005) 
  Negative surprise, female * Squared deviation    
  from mean duration         
0.0001    
(0.0002)      
  Positive surprise, male * Squared deviation    
  from mean duration         
-0.00008*   
 (0.00004)     
  Negative surprise, male * Squared deviation    
  from mean duration         
-0.0002*    
(0.0001)     
  Female pos. surprise / Male pos. surprise  -0.166**   
 (0.071)     
  Female pos. surprise / Male neg. surprise  0.0004    
(0.087) 
  Female neg. surprise / Male neg. surprise  -0.061    
(0.158)   
  Female neg. surprise / Male pos. surprise  -0.092    
(0.100)     
 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** Statistically significant at the 5 
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Abstract. This paper studies the role of unemployment in the dissolu-
tion of relationships by applying a two-step estimation method to an ex-
tensive data set, which contains information about young Swedish males 
and females. Unemployment is recognized as endogenous in the separa-
tion decision, and the results show that the effect of unemployment on 
separation is biased when unemployment is assumed to be exogenous in 
the separation equation. The probability of separation is found to be in-
creasing with male unemployment, whereas female unemployment de-
creases the probability of dissolution.  
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There has been an increase in the number of divorces in Sweden over 
the past 40 years, with a peak in the mid 1970’s. Since then, the number 
of divorces has been stabilized at a fairly high level as compared to the 
level before the 1970’s. At the same time, even though the unemploy-
ment rate has decreased as part of the recovery from the 1990’s reces-
sion, it is still higher than its pre-recession level. Becoming unemployed 
is likely to be a vital event in an individual’s life. Being subjected to un-
employment is often associated with deterioration in both the individ-
ual’s psychological and physical well-being (e.g. Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann, 1998). Deteriorating physical and mental health can, to-
gether with economic hardship following on unemployment, increase 
the probability of marital dissolution among couples. The purpose of this 
paper is to analyse the effects of unemployment on the probability of 
separation
1 among committed couples.  
 
The economic theory of divorce stems from the influential article of 
Becker et al. (1977), which suggests two main explanations for divorce. 
First, learning about match quality is crucial for the stability of a rela-
tionship, and separation could be initiated if either partner meets some-
one that is considered as a better match. Second, there can be a deviation 
between the utility you originally expected from marriage and the utility 
that is actually realized. Both these explanations have been subject to 
empirical investigation and in several of the previous articles on the sub-
ject, unemployment has been introduced as a control variable. For in-
stance, Bracher et al. (1993), Böheim and Ermisch (2001), Jalovaara 
(2001), Svarer (2004, 2005) and Norberg-Schönfeldt (2007) find posi-
tive relationships between unemployment and divorce. However, it is 
possible that there is a problem of introducing unemployment in a di-
vorce equation. It may be hard to determine the timing of unemployment 
and divorce; is the divorce caused by unemployment, or do people end 
up in unemployment because their relationship is bad? Unemployment 
may be endogenous for the divorce decision as some underlying unob-
servable factors may influence both variables.  
 
Studies that explicitly focus on the role of unemployment in the decision 
to divorce have, so far, been very few. Jensen and Smith (1990) use 
panel data from Denmark and find male unemployment to be associated 
with an increased probability of divorce, while no effects are found for 
female unemployment. Jensen and Smith base their analysis on the ac-
                                                 
1 The words separation, dissolution and divorce will be used interchangeably throughout 
the paper. The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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tual divorce date, which brings attention to the question of causality. If 
there is a deviation between the date of separation and the date of actual 
divorce, the unemployment may begin in between. Therefore, the results 
may show an increased probability of divorce following unemployment, 
when the true effect is, instead, that the separation (i.e. the impending 
divorce) has increased the risk of unemployment.  
 
Lampard (1994) addresses the issue of timing more explicitly when ana-
lysing whether unemployment affects divorce, or whether divorce af-
fects the risk of unemployment. The results show that the causality 
works in both directions. One way of minimizing the potential problem 
with causality is to use the separation date instead of the actual divorce 
date when analysing the effect of unemployment, as is done in Kraft 
(2001). Kraft is the first to actually utilize panel methods, in terms of 
fixed and random effect approaches, in analysing the effect of unem-
ployment on divorce. He claims that this is important, since it is possible 
that individual-specific characteristics have an influence both on the risk 
of becoming unemployed and the probability of separation. For the same 
reason as Kraft (2001), Hansen (2005) also utilizes panel data methods 
in his study of the effect of unemployment on marriage stability among 
Norwegian couples. Although the use of fixed or random effects meth-
ods accounts for individual-specific effects, which could certainly be 
present when studying divorce, these methods do not necessarily ac-
count for the fact that something may be omitted that influences both 
occurrences, in which case unemployment would be correlated with the 
error term of the divorce equation.  
 
Therefore, the model used when analysing the effect of unemployment 
on divorce in this paper is a two-step simultaneous equation model ac-
counting for the possible endogeneity of unemployment. The possible 
appearance of additional individual-specific effects will be accounted 
for using a random effects method. To ensure that the correct causality is 
observed, the date of separation instead of the divorce date will be used.  
 
This study contributes to the existent literature in that it is the first at-
tempt to deal with the possible simultaneity problem of introducing un-
employment in the divorce equation. The data set used is extensive and 
the number of observations and explanatory variables exceed those of 
previous studies. Finally, this is the first attempt to more thoroughly ana-
lyse the role played by unemployment in the termination of relationships 
using Swedish data.  
 
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing theo-
ries and empirical results on the determinants of divorce in general, and The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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the role of unemployment in particular. Section 3 gives a description of 
the data and section 4 specifies the empirical model. Section 5 presents 
the results and section 6 gives a concluding summary. 
 
2  Existing Theories and Empirical Results 
 
Over the past three decades, many researchers have addressed the ques-
tion of why the divorce rates in the western world have increased. This 
has lead to several theories and explanations of divorce and divorce pat-
terns, some of which are economic, while others are related to other ar-
eas such as sociology
2. Within economics, the theory of family forma-
tion and dissolution is based on utility maximization. One of the most 
important contributions to the economic theory of divorce is the article 
by Becker et al. (1977), which explains that people get married or en-
gage in committed relationships when their expected utility from being 
in the relationship exceeds their expected utility from remaining single, 
and that they divorce when the opposite occurs.  
 
Like many other decisions, getting married is associated with rewards as 
well as a substantial risk. At the time of engagement, there is uncertainty 
about several factors that influence the utility from the relationship. 
Hence, marital instability is a natural consequence of incomplete in-
formation about partner characteristics, productivity and spousal needs. 
Therefore, the expected and the realized utility from the relationship can 
deviate, and the Becker et al. model indicates the importance of, for ex-
ample, age at the start of commitment, education, income, number of 
children and unexpected events for the probability of divorce. The im-
plications do, to some extent, depend on the society surrounding the 
couple. In a society characterized by the traditional division of labour, 
so-called negative assortative mating may be preferable where oppo-
sites, who are able to complement each other, are attracted to each other. 
In a society characterized by a more equal division of labour (market 
and non-market), positive assortative mating may instead apply and 
people are looking for an equal. 
 
                                                 
2 One theory linking unemployment to marital instability is the ABC-X model (e.g. Voy-
danoff, 1983). It implies that the infliction of unemployment on a family depends upon the 
interaction of the family’s coping resources and the family’s perception of the crisis. Un-
employment can stress a relationship in several ways. For example, unemployment will of-
ten lead to financial stress. In addition, it may lead to the perception of moral failure either 
for the unemployed or for the spouse, and it may cause psychological deterioration which 
could stress the relationship. Another theory is the social exchange theory, which recog-
nizes the economic, social and psychological costs and gains from marriage (e.g. Levinger, 
1982).  
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The implication of age at the start of commitment is connected to search 
theory. If the search for a partner is costly, people will tend to search for 
a shorter time period. This increases the probability of making a rel-
atively poor match which, in turn, would increase the probability of dis-
solution. Different levels of, for example, education and income or dif-
ferent religions or different ethnicities are also connected to the quality 
of the match, and if there are large deviations between spouses, the 
probability of divorce increases in a society where positive assortative 
mating is relatively beneficial. Even if there are no considerable differ-
ences at the time of engagement, i.e. the match quality is initially high, 
the spouses may come to deviate in terms of the level of education or in-
come as the relationship goes on, which would then increase the divorce 
probability of dissolution. The number of children is, together with ac-
quiring property and adding to the stock of information about ones’ 
partner, examples of investments in commitment specific capital that are 
considered to increase the gains from remaining in the commitment. 
There are several studies that are concerned with both marriage forma-
tion and marital dissolution, and the results generally confirm the impor-
tance of the above mentioned factors. 
 
Since partners are matched into commitment based on the information 
that is known at the time of commitment and the predictions that can be 
made about the unknown characteristics of the partner, new information 
can change the expected gains from staying in the relationship. The least 
explored contribution of the Becker et al. model is the role of unex-
pected events, which is where unemployment belongs. Factors like un-
expected changes in money transfers, income or long-term earnings ca-
pacity have been explored in some studies (e.g. Weiss and Willis 1997, 
Böheim and Ermisch, 2001, Svarer, 2005, Walker and Zhu, 2006, and 
Norberg-Schönfeldt, 2007). However, as has already been mentioned, 
the number of studies focusing on the role of unemployment on divorce, 
in a more extensive fashion than just including it as a control variable, 
has been limited.  
 
If a person becomes unemployed, this can be interpreted as an un-
expected event since unemployment may be hard to foresee. Unemploy-
ment by one spouse may reduce the partner’s expected utility of staying 
in the relationship because of the financial stress, and the probability of 
divorce would then increase with the number of days in unemployment. 
Besides the monetary factors associated with unemployment, unemploy-
ment is often connected to other psychological factors that can reduce 
the expected gains from marriage. Preferences for risk sharing can, to 
some extent, counteract the effect of unemployment on divorce.  
 The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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In her review on unemployment and families, Ström (2003) discusses 
the empirical work up to date that has paid special attention to unem-
ployment and its role in the divorce decision. Some of the studies she 
mentions focus on male unemployment only; Ross and Sawhill (1975) 
analyse the role of male unemployment and find that unstable male em-
ployment increases the divorce probability; Conger et al. (1990) and 
Sander (1992) confirm these results. Jensen and Smith (1990), Lampard 
(1994) and Starkey (1996) analyse both male and female unemploy-
ment, and find male unemployment to be more closely linked to marital 
dissolution than female unemployment.  
 
It is interesting that all the above results indicate that the effect of male 
unemployment is more severe than the effect of female unemployment. 
Ström (2003) hypothesizes that this may be due to women having more 
developed social networks outside the labour market, and that un-
employment would reduce their double burden of paid and unpaid work. 
Moreover, because of the traditional division of labour, females may be 
less traumatized by unemployment, which may be the reason for the re-
sults found in the above studies. Sweden is, however, considered to be a 
country of high gender equality, at least when it comes to female educa-
tion and labour force participation, which means that this may not be the 
case for Swedish couples. However, the same type of results as the 
above are found by Kraft (2001) whose study relates to modern German 
families where the traditional gender roles, with the male as a breadwin-
ner, may not be as clear cut either.  
 
The one exception to the above results is the study by Hansen (2005) on 
Norwegian data. He finds that the divorce probability increases with 
both male and female unemployment in a similar fashion. Since Sweden 
and Norway are quite similar with respect to female labour force partici-
pation and social security systems, the same results as found by Hansen 
may also apply to Swedish data.  
 
3 Data   
 
The empirical study is based on data from the LOUISE part of the 
LISA-data base along with compulsory school and secondary school 
graduation registers obtained from Statistics Sweden. The LISA-data 
base is longitudinal and contains yearly observations on family situation, 
education, income and labour force participation for all Swedes aged 16-
64. The graduation registers contain information about grade point aver-
age (GPA) from compulsory and upper secondary school. In addition, 




3 obtained from the National Service Administration, 
which is responsible for enrolling, enlisting and administering those eli-
gible for national military service. The tests are taken by most males 
who are Swedish citizens in the year they turn 18. 
 
The sample comes from a cohort of 110 000 individuals born in 1973 
and registered in Sweden in December 31, 1990. The individuals were 
followed between 1990 and 2003. A sample of 45 120 individuals has 
been selected from this data set. The selected individuals are those who 
entered a committed relationship between the years 1993 and 2002. A 
relationship is defined to be committed if the individual is cohabiting 
with children or is married (with or without children). Only the first 
committed relationship of every individual in the sample is considered. 
The individuals are observed annually from the first year of commitment 
until they separate or the observation period ends.  
 
Since the information about partner characteristics is limited, it is not 
possible to choose either males or females as representatives for the 
couple. It is, however, possible that the effects of unemployment, and 
the correlation between unemployment and divorce, differ between men 
and women. Therefore, the analysis is carried out separately for males 
and females. The samples contain information on 18 764 males (with 
female partners) and 26 356 females (with male partners). Survival fre-
quency by commitment year for the observed males and females is given 
in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the probability of dissolution is decreasing 
with the year for the start of the commitment. Males tend to enter into 
committed relationships later than females, as the commitment year of 
females is more evenly distributed over the observation period. The sur-
vival frequency for males is in general lower than the survival frequency 
for females for any given year.  
 
 
                                                 
3 The evaluation of non-cognitive traits consists of medical and physical tests and one in-
terview with a psychologist and one with an enrolment officer. Physical fitness and 
strength are also evaluated. The enrolment test of cognitive traits includes measurements 
of linguistic comprehension, technical understanding and logistical and spatial awareness.  
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Table 1. Survival Frequency by Commitment Year, Males 
 
  Year for Start of Commitment 
Duration  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
  0  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
    1  0.87  0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 
    2  0.78  0.81 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.93   
    3  0.69  0.72 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.88 0.90     
    4  0.63  0.67 0.70 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.85       
    5  0.57  0.63 0.66 0.70 0.75 0.79         
    6  0.52  0.57 0.62 0.67 0.72           
    7  0.50  0.53  0.60  0.64        
    8  0.48  0.51  0.56         
    9  0.46  0.48          
    10  0.45           
N  484  732  1 042 1 338 1 595 1 855 2 313 2 897 3 105  3 403 
 
Table 2. Survival Frequency by Commitment Year, Females 
 
  Year for Start of Commitment 
Duration  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
  0  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
  1  0.91  0.92 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98  0.98 
  2  0.82  0.84 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95   
  3  0.76  0.77 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.91    
  4  0.70  0.71 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.87      
    5  0.64  0.67 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.82     
    6  0.60  0.63 0.69 0.73 0.73      
    7  0.56  0.59 0.67 0.70       
    8  0.53  0.56 0.64        
    9  0.50  0.53         
    10  0.47           
N  1 611  1 837 2 165 2 281 2 557 2 660 3 017 3 482 3 313  3 442 
 
The variables used in the empirical analysis are based on earlier litera-
ture dealing with quality of match and gains from commitment. The 
variables are divided into individual-specific characteristics, parental 
characteristics, partner characteristics and characteristics related to the 
relationship. Parental characteristics are included in order to control for 
socioeconomic circumstances during childhood. Earnings, schooling and 
age of the spouses and differences in schooling age and ethnicity be-
tween spouses are all variables that have previously been found to have 
negative effects on the probability of separation.
4 Variables that are 
                                                 
4 See Weiss and Willis (1997) and Svarer (2004, 2005). The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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likely to influence the number of days an individual spends in unem-
ployment in a given year are also included. These variables reflect are 
individual characteristics, parental characteristics and regional character-
istics. Ethnicity, age and schooling are variables likely to affect the num-
ber of days an individual spends in unemployment in a given year, but 
socioeconomic background is also likely to be of importance.
5 Defini-
tions and explanations of variables are given in Table A1 of Appendix 
A. 
 
Descriptive statistics for males and females are displayed in Table 3 be-
low. The descriptive statistics are displayed separately for individuals 
whose relationships remained committed throughout the observation pe-
riod (i.e. were still committed at year 2003) and individuals whose rela-
tionships ended during the observation period. Descriptive statistics for 
time varying variables are measured the year before the relationship 
ends for individuals who end up separating and the year before the ob-
servation period ends for individuals who remain committed throughout 
the observation period, which makes it hard to directly compare the 
means of the time varying variables over relationship outcome.  
 
As can be seen from Table 3, individuals who separated were younger 
when their relationship started, and they have attained a lower grade 
point average (GPA). They are also to a larger extent born outside of 
Sweden. For men, it is also apparent that those who end up separating 
are those achieving a lower result in cognitive and non-cognitive traits 
on the evaluation performed by the National Service Administration. 
Once more, it is clear that males enter into committed relationships later 
than females. When comparing the columns of Table 3, it also looks as 
though individuals who separate have lower annual earnings, spend 
more days in unemployment and have a lower educational level, meas-
ured as the number of years of schooling, than those who remain com-
mitted. When making comparisons between the columns in the below 
table, it must, however, be remembered that the year of measurement 
differs over relationship outcome.  
 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Machin and Manning (1999) and Altonji and Blank (1999). The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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Table 3. Individual Specific Characteristics, Means 
 
 Males  Females 
Variable Name  Committedt Dissolvedt Committedt Dissolvedt 
  Age at Start of  
  Commitment 
26.43   
(2.29)       
23.87    
(2.42)   
25.70     
(2.60)       
23.05    
(2.38) 
Labour Market Variables       
  Earningst-1  2.47     
(1.19)       
1.56     
(1.08)     
1.54    
(0.87)       
0.92    
(0.78)     
  Days in Unemployment t-1   31.92    
(84.62)       
101.74    
(138.38) 
49.65   
(103.10) 
116.46    
(132.52) 
 Education       
  Compulsory Schoolt-1  0.10 0.27  0.06 0.24 
  Upper Secondary Schoolt-1 0.60 0.62  0.53 0.62 
  Universityt-1  0.29 0.11  0.41 0.14 
  GPA Compulsory 
  School    
3.04     
(0.70) 
2.64    
(0.74)     
3.33     
(0.67)       
2.92      
(0.74) 
Ethnicity        
  Sweden  0.95  0.89  0.95  0.91 
  Born Abroad  0.05  0.11  0.05  0.09 
Military Service Variables        
  Evaluation of Non- 
  Cognitive Traits 
5.21   
(1.71)       
4.43    
(1.82)     
  
  Test of Cognitive Traits  4.87    
(1.88)       
4.10     
(1.85)     
  
Number of Observations  15 437  3 327  21 151  5 205 
 
Note: Standard deviations are given within parentheses. Earnings are annual earnings, in 
the price level for the year 2000, expressed in hundred thousand SEK. 
 
Apart from individual characteristics, one thing that may influence the 
number of days an individual spends in unemployment in a given year is 
the state of the labour market where he or she participates. To control 
for this, a variable measuring the regional employment growth rate will 
be included in the analysis.
6 Since parental characteristics are often 
found to have an influence on children’s labour market success, char-
acteristics such as parental income, parental education and parental eth-
nicity are of interest. Descriptive statistics for parental characteristics are 
displayed in Table 4 below. Once more, they are displayed separately 
for males and females and for relationship outcome. 
 
                                                 
6 Other variables could have been chosen, for example, the unemployment rate in the la-
bour market region or the number of labour market opportunities. All these measures are, 
however, likely to be highly correlated and in that case, the choice will be of minor impor-
tance. For an explanation of this variable, see Table A1 of Appendix A.  The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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Table 4. Parental Characteristics, Means 
 
 Males  Females 
Variable  Name  Committedt Dissolvedt Committedt Dissolvedt 
  Mothers’ Earnings  1.21     
(0.62)       
1.12     
(0.60)     
1.22     
(0.61)       
1.14     
(0.60)   
  Fathers’ Earnings  1.94     
(1.08)       
1.71     
(0.90)     
1.98      
(1.06) 
1.77     
(1.04)     
Mothers’ Education        
  Compulsory School  0.31 0.35  0.31 0.37 
  Upper Secondary School  0.47  0.50  0.47  0.47 
  University  0.22  0.15  0.22  0.16 
Fathers’ Education       
  Compulsory School  0.38 0.42  0.37 0.40 
  Upper Secondary School  0.42  0.45  0.42  0.44 
  University  0.20  0.13  0.21  0.16 
 Mothers’ Ethnicity        
  Sweden  0.87  0.80  0.88  0.83 
  Born Abroad  0.13  0.20  0.12  0.17 
 Fathers’ Ethnicity        
  Sweden  0.86  0.79  0.87  0.81 
  Born Abroad  0.14  0.21  0.13  0.19 
Number of Observations  15 437  3 327  21 151  5 205 
 
Note: Standard deviations are given within parentheses. Parental characteristics are meas-
ured over the years 1990-1992. Earnings are mean annual earnings, in the price level for 
the year 2000, expressed in hundred thousand SEK. 
 
The stability of a relationship is naturally not only dependent upon one 
person and his or her characteristics, but is also dependent upon the 
characteristics of the partner. For the partners of the individuals in the 
sample, there is information about age, earnings, ethnicity and edu-
cation. The descriptive statistics for partner characteristics are given in 
Table 5 below. 
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Table 5. Partner Characteristics, Means  
 
  Males Females 
Variable Name  Committedt Dissolvedt Committedt Dissolvedt 
  Age at Start of  
  Commitment 
26.07    
(3.68) 
23.51   
(3.91)     
28.64     
(4.14)       
26.86    
(4.62)     
  Partner’s Earningst-1  1.39    
(0.83) 
0.87     
(0.80)     
2.53     
(1.40)       
1.63     
(1.16)     
Partners’ Education       
  Compulsory Schoolt-1  0.08 0.27  0.09 0.23 
  Upper Secondary Schoolt -1  0.54 0.59  0.58 0.63 
  Universityt-1  0.38 0.13  0.34 0.15 
 Partners’ Ethnicity       
  Sweden  0.92  0.87  0.92  0.84 
  Born Abroad  0.08  0.13  0.08  0.16 
Number of Observations  15 437  3 327  21 151  5 205 
 
Note: Standard deviations are given within parentheses. Earnings are annual earnings, in 
the price level for the year 2000, expressed in hundred thousand SEK. 
 
Apart from the characteristics of the partners in the relationship, there 
are also some characteristics specific to the couple that could influence 
the relationship outcome. One such characteristic is the number of chil-
dren of the couple. Descriptive statistics for the couple specific charac-
teristics are given in Table 6 below.  
 
Table 6. Couple Characteristics, Means 
 
 Males  Females 
Variable Name  Committedt Dissolvedt Committedt Dissolvedt 
  Duration of Commitmentt-1   3.57     
(2.29) 
3.02     
(1.92)     
4.29     
(2.60)       
3.41     
(2.15)     
  Number of Childrent-1  1.31  
(0.86)       
1.26     
(0.80)   
1.39     
(0.84)       
1.25     
(0.77) 
  Living in Cityt-1  0.40 0.38  0.40 0.39 
  Social Assistance  
  Recipientst-1  0.02 0.25  0.01 0.20 
  Different Ethnicity  0.09  0.13  0.09  0.17 
  Different level of  
  educationt-1  0.37 0.43  0.37 0.43 
Number of Observations  15 437  3 327  21 151  5 205 
 
Note: Standard deviations are given within parentheses.  The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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4 Empirical  model 
 
This section presents the empirical model. As previously discussed, one 
problem when evaluating the impact of unemployment on divorce is that 
individuals systematically act on the basis of unobservable characteris-
tics. In this case, one possible characteristic would be the ability to live 
up to one’s obligations or promises. Such information is likely to influ-
ence both the number of days an individual will be unemployed in a 
given year and, at the same time, it may influence the probability that 
the individual will end up separating. If an individual who, on average, 
has longer unemployment spells also has a less serious view on relation-
ships, the effect of unemployment on separation will be biased upwards 
if estimated as a single probit.  
 
To control for the possible bias due to the endogeneity of unemploy-
ment, the model used to analyse separations in this paper is a two-
equation simultaneous panel data model of the following form:
7  
 
  t , i t , i 1
1
t , i 1 1 t , i z x U µ γ β α + + + =    (1) 
  t , i t , i t , i 2
2
t , i 2 2 1 t , i U z x D ω δ γ β α + + + + = +    (2)  
 
where the dependent variables  t , i U  and  1 t , i D +  measure the number of 
days in unemployment in year t and the occurrence of separation in year 
t+1, respectively
8. The vectors 
1
t , i x  and 
2
t , i x  are explanatory variables 
specific to each equation, while  t , i z  contains explanatory variables in-








t , i t , i u + = ε ω  both consist of time-varying components, 
1
t , i ε  and 
2
t , i ε , 
and time invariant individual-specific terms, 
1
i u  and 
2
i u . A random ef-
fects approach is used, which is mainly motivated by the fact that the 
size of the cross section exceeds the time series observations by far, and 
by the fact that several of the control variables are time invariant.  
                                                 
7 An alternative approach would have been to specify the model as a bivariate probit. A 
bivariate probit model would, however, have required a binary specification of unem-
ployment. Different specifications of unemployment have been tried in a bivariate probit 
but, when trying to utilize the panel structure of the data, the estimation becomes unsuc-
cessful. 
8 As previously mentioned, the reason for using the number of days in unemployment the 
year before the separation is to avoid including observations on unemployment that have, 
in fact, been measured after the separation has occurred. The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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Since separation is only observed annually, the explanatory variables 
from the previous period are used in order to avoid including values on 
explanatory variables that are measured after the separation has oc-
curred. As previously mentioned, the effect of unemployment on divorce 
could differ between males and females. Therefore, the above model 
will be estimated separately for males (controlling for characteristics of 
their female partners) and females (together with their male partners).   
 
The inclusion of the number of days in unemployment in equation (2) 
poses a potential problem. If unemployment is correlated with the dis-
turbance term of equation (2), that is, if the stochastic components of the 
disturbances from the two equations are correlated, an ordinary probit 
estimation of equation (2) will result in biased estimates. Therefore, the 
model is estimated using a two-step estimation procedure, in a way simi-
lar to Bollen et al. (1995) and Norton et al. (1998). The first step in-
volves a generalized least squares (GLS) estimation of equation (1). The 
estimated coefficients are used to predict the number of days in unem-
ployment ( t , i U ˆ ) for each individual in every period of time. The pre-
dicted values are then used to replace the actual days of unemployment 
in equation (2). The second step is a probit estimation of equation (2), 
where the estimated standard errors must be adjusted because of the in-
clusion of the predicted value of the number of days in unemployment. 
The correction is carried out using the Murphy and Topel (1985) correc-
tion of the estimated covariance matrix.  
 
In order to determine whether unemployment is, indeed, endogenous in 
the divorce equation, or whether the divorce equation could be estimated 
as a single equation probit model, an exogeneity test is carried out; see, 
for example, Smith and Blundell (1986) or Rivers and Voung (1988). 
This test examines whether the unobservables in the equation for the 
number of days in unemployment help explain the variation in the prob-
ability of divorce after controlling for the observable explanatory vari-
ables. In the test, the estimated error term from equation (1) is included 
together with the actual number of days in unemployment in the divorce 
equation. A t-test of the significance of the coefficient on the estimated 
error term is then performed. If the coefficient is not significantly differ-
ent from zero, the null hypothesis that the number of days in unemploy-
ment is exogenous in the divorce equation cannot be rejected. If so, 
equation (2) could be estimated by simple single probit regression.  
 
If unemployment is found to be endogenous, identifying restrictions 
must be imposed on the exogenous variables in order to obtain consist-
ent parameter estimates. Since there is one supposedly endogenous vari-The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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able, at least one variable must be excluded from the separation equa-
tion. The model must then be tested for validity of the instruments.  
 
5 Results   
 
In this section, the results from the estimation of the two equation simul-
taneous panel data model in equations (1) and (2) are presented and dis-
cussed. The results for the male sample are presented and analysed in 
subsection 5.1, whereas the results for the female sample are given in 
subsection 5.2.  
 
5.1  The effect of unemployment on divorce, male sample 
This subsection begins with a discussion about the GLS results from the 
unemployment equation (1), which are presented in Table 7. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion about the probit results for the separation equation 
(2), which are displayed in Table 8.  
 






Individual-Specific Characteristics   
  Age  -12.47***      
 (0.18) 
  Born Abroad  16.93***       
 (2.59) 
  Upper Secondary School  -10.62***        
(1.64) 
  University  -8.18***   
(2.19) 
  Compulsory School GPA  -16.30***       
 (1.05) 
  GPA Missing  -17.85***        
(4.46) 
  Evaluation of Non-Cognitive Traits  -4.63***        
(0.40) 
  Evaluation Missing  -10.73***       
 (2.57) 
  Living in City  -15.57***        
(1.17) 
  Regional Employment Growth Rate  -3.19***       
 (0.24) 
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Table 7. Continued 
 
Parental Characteristics   
  Mother Earnings  -3.91***      
 (0.94) 
  Father Earnings  -3.89***       
 (0.52) 
  Constant  484.68***      
 (5.49) 
Model Information   
  LM test of no random effects  (1 df)   29591.16 
  R
2-adjusted 0.16 
Number of Observations  65 125 
 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** Statistically significant at the 5 
percent level, *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
 
The null hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity can be rejected 
judging by the high value of the LM-test statistic reported in Table 7, 
which is well above the critical value for any level of significance. The 
number of days in unemployment seems to be decreasing with age, edu-
cation and compulsory school GPA. It is also decreasing with the 
evaluation of non-cognitive traits from the National Service Administ-
ration, as can be seen by column 2. The variable “evaluation missing”, 
which is reported in the table, shows a large negative impact on unem-
ployment of not having participated in the non-cognitive evaluation. Be-
sides being an immigrant, those with a missing result from the evalua-
tion are those who had already started their higher education by the time 
of enrolment and those who studied four years of upper secondary 
school and were, therefore, excused. These individuals are expected to 
be less likely to become unemployed. Others who miss the evaluation 
are, for instance, those with allergies, bad eyesight or hearing problems.  
 
The number of days in unemployment is lower for people living in an 
urban area and for those who live in a labour market region with a high 
employment growth rate. Parental earnings also have a negative impact 
on the number of days in unemployment.
9  
 
                                                 
9 Versions of the model that include parental education have also been estimated since this 
is likely to be a determinant of the child’s labour market performance. Parental education 
is, however, highly correlated with own education and parental earnings and it is, there-
fore, excluded in the final model without any consequences for the main results. The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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Table 8 below gives the probit results from the separation equation. 
Column 1 reports the result of a probit estimation, where unemployment 
is treated as an exogenous variable.
10  
 
Much as expected, the results in column 1 of Table 8 show that the 
probability of dissolution increases with the number of days in unem-
ployment. In order to determine whether to use the observed number of 
days in unemployment as an explanatory variable in the separation equa-
tion or not, let us first discuss the predictive power of the estimated un-
employment equation. The reported R
2 from Table 7 is 0.16. If the R
2 is 
less than 0.1, the simple probit estimator could be preferred over the 
two-step estimator, at least when sample sizes are small according to 
Bollen et al. (1995). The R
2 of Table 7 is higher than 0.1, the sample size 
is fairly large, and the parameter estimates are highly significant. Al-
though this is interpreted as “enough” predictive power, the reader 
should keep the somewhat low R
2-value in mind.  
 
As has previously been mentioned, for the separation equation to be 
identified, at least one restriction must be imposed on the separation 
equation. The excluded variables, i.e. the instrumental variables, are the 
variables measuring participation and result from the evaluation of non-
cognitive traits, the variable measuring employment growth rate and the 
variable measuring if the individual was born abroad. It is important to 
choose instrument variables that are unlikely to be directly correlated 
with relationship outcome. The use of employment growth rate as an in-
strument can easily be motivated as being directly connected to labour 
market activities. When it comes to the result from the non-cognitive 
test, the measured characteristics are probably observed by the potential 
partner at the start of the relationship. Therefore, it is highly likely to be 
a determinant of whether you are matched into a commitment to start 
with. Since these characteristics are likely to be observed at the start, 
they should not be of any significance for the future of the relationship. 
Being born abroad is also something that is known at the start of the re-
lationship; it is unlikely that simply the fact that an individual is born 
abroad should have any significant influence on the relationship out-
come. However, if the spouses are of different ethnicities, it is likely to 
influence the relationship since it is probably harder to keep a relation-
                                                 
10 There is no evidence of random effects in the separation equation, which may be due to 
the respondents of the sample entering into relationships relatively late and that there are 
not enough time series observations for any random effects to be detected. However, to 
control for the possibility of other forms of non-independence of observations over time, 
than what is supported by the random effects approach, the standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering on individuals.  
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ship stable if you have different religions or different cultural back-
grounds.  
 
To make an assessment of the validity of the instruments, four tests have 
been performed. First of all, the instruments need to have a significant 
impact on the number of days in unemployment. Individual t-tests of the 
instruments show that each instrument significantly affects the number 
of days in unemployment. To determine whether the instruments, as a 
group, affect the number of days in unemployment, an F-test was per-
formed. The F-test returned a value of 222.7 with four degrees of free-
dom, which is well above the critical value for any level of significance. 
These tests conclude that the instruments are strong predictors of the 
number of days in unemployment. The third test involves a likelihood 
ratio test between the log likelihood of the model of column 3 (where 
the endogeneity of unemployment days is accounted for) and the likeli-
hood of its counterpart where the instruments are used to substitute for 
the predicted number of unemployment days. The null hypothesis of va-
lidity means that the model of column 3 is the correct specification. If 
the instruments are valid, there should be no significant difference be-
tween the log likelihoods. The LR-test gives a value of 6.23 with three 
degrees of freedom, which is not significant at the 90 percent level. The 
fourth test involves t-tests on the coefficients for the instruments when 
all but one are included in the model of column 3. Neither of the coeffi-
cients is significant. The above discussion leads to the conclusion that 
the instruments are valid. Therefore, these instruments will be used. 
 
Column 2 of Table 8 presents the probit regressions for divorce; both the 
observed number of days in unemployment and the estimated residual 
from the unemployment equation are included as regressors. A t-test for 
the coefficient on the estimated error term from the unemployment 
equation is the test of the null hypothesis that the number of days in un-
employment is exogenous. The test rejects exogeneity of the number of 
days in unemployment. Therefore, the suggested two step procedure is 
more appropriate for estimating the impact of the number of days in un-
employment on separation. Due to the above discussion, the following 
analysis will be based on the results from column 3. Marginal effects for 
the variables can be found in Table B1 of Appendix B. 
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 Table 8. Probit Results for Separation Equation, Males 
 
  Column 









Individual-Specific Characteristics     
  Predicted Unemployment Days      0.002**  
(0.001) 
  Unemployment Days  0.0002**  
(0.001) 
0.002***  
(0.001)   
  Estimated Error from      
  Unemployment Equation    -0.002***  
(0.001)   




0.006   
(0.01) 
  Upper Secondary School  -0.12***   
(0.02) 
-0.10***  
(0.03)    
-0.10***  
(0.03)    
  University  -0.26***   
(0.04) 
-0.24***   
(0.04) 
-0.24***   
(0.04) 






  GPA missing  -0.27***   
(0.06) 
-0.24***   
(0.06) 
-0.24***   
(0.06) 
  Earnings  -0.05***  
(0.01) 
-0.05***  
(0.01)    
-0.06***  
(0.01)    
Partner Characteristics     
  Older (in years)  0.01*   
(0.005) 










  Born Abroad  -0.17***   
(0.04) 
-0.17***   
(0.04) 
-0.17***   
(0.04) 












  Earnings  -0.01   
(0.01) 
-0.01   
(0.01) 
-0.01   
(0.01) 
Parental Characteristics     
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Table 8. Continued 
 
Couple Characteristics     
  Different Ethnicity  0.21***   
(0.03) 
0.20***   
(0.03) 
0.20***   
(0.03) 
  Living in City   0.09***  
(0.02) 
0.12***   
(0.02) 
0.12***   
(0.02) 
  Social Assistance Recipients  0.42***   
(0.03) 
0.41***   
(0.03) 
0.43***   
(0.03) 
  Children ≤ 3 Years   -0.03*   
(0.01) 
-0.03*   
(0.01) 
-0.03*   
(0.01) 
  Children 4-6 Years   0.10***   
(0.02)     
0.10***   
(0.02)     
0.10***   
(0.02)     










-0.02   
(0.05) 
  Children 16-17 Years   0.14       
(0.13) 
0.14       
(0.13) 
0.14       
(0.13) 
  Constant  -0.50***       
(0.12) 
-1.37***       
(0.44) 
-1.36***       
(0.44) 
Model Information     
  Log likelihood  -12325.78  -12323.66  -12326.45 
  Chi squared   1620.07 
(23df) 




  Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.06 
Number of Observations  65 125  65 125  65 125 
 
Note: Standard errors of columns 2 and 3 have been Murphy and Topel corrected for the 
inclusion of predicted values of unemployment days and the predicted error term, respec-
tively. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering. * Statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, *** Statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level 
    
From Table 8 above, it is clear that the probability of separation is in-
creasing with the number of days in unemployment for the male sample. 
From Table B1 of Appendix B, it can be seen that the marginal effect of 
unemployment is 0.0002, which may seem small as compared to the 
separation probability as a whole for males, which equals 0.051. How-
ever, it must be remembered that this is the effect of one additional day 
in unemployment. One additional month would apparently have quite a 
substantial effect on the probability of separation. It is, however, likely 
that the effect of one additional unemployment day is nonlinear.
11 Com-
pared to the marginal effect of unemployment in the simple probit esti-
                                                 
11 A loglinear specification has been tried as well as squared and cubed terms without add-
ing to the information.   The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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mation, the effect is larger when endogeneity is controlled for. This 
means that the effect in the simple probit equation was underestimated, 
instead of overestimated as expected. There must be some unobserved 
characteristic that is causing a downward bias; an example could be if 
you are a careerist. This would have a negative effect on unemployment 
but could, if you work long hours, have a positive effect on separation 
probability.  
 
There is no direct effect on dissolution of own age. This result somewhat 
contradicts the theory of match quality but, on the other hand, age here 
is not equivalent to age at the start of the commitment, which could be 
the reason for the result. It should also be remembered that a large nega-
tive effect of age was found on unemployment days in Table 7. The co-
efficients for the variables measuring deviations in age both show that 
the probability of separation increases with larger differences in age. 
Similar results have been found in several other studies and suggest that 
people at different levels of maturity have less stable relationships.  
 
Having a partner who was born abroad has a stabilizing direct effect on 
the commitment. This should, however, be interpreted with caution. 
There was no direct effect of the individual himself being born abroad 
on divorce which allowed for the use of that variable as an instrument. 
Therefore, it is possible that no direct effect would be found from the 
partner being born abroad, if it were possible to control for partner un-
employment, since being born abroad could be a proxy for unemploy-
ment. Being of different ethnicities is, instead, destabilizing, which is 
something that confirms the idea of positive assortative mating.
12 This 
could be related to people of different cultures or religions having dif-
ferent attitudes towards relationships and/or divorces which could com-
plicate matters. 
 
For educational level, the direct and indirect effects both work in the di-
rection of reducing the separation probability, but the probability is 
somewhat higher for couples where the male is more educated than the 
female. Living in a city has a direct destabilizing effect on relationships, 
which is in line with previous findings (e.g. Svarer, 2004, 2005) and one 
explanation is that there are more alternative matches for people living 
in a city. The indirect effect through unemployment reduces the negative 
impact, however. 
 
                                                 
12 The simultaneous inclusion of the two being born abroad variables together with the dif-
ferent ethnicities variable may seem somewhat odd. The variable measuring different eth-
nicities is, however, defined in such a way that even if both spouses were born abroad, 
they can still be of different ethnicities.   The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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Male earnings seem to be more important for a steady relationship, since 
the probability of separation is decreasing with male earnings. This 
shows that, at least for women, the gains from commitment are increa-
sing with income. A couple receiving social assistance are more likely to 
separate than others. As stated in Norberg-Schönfeldt (2007), receiving 
social assistance could often be connected with other factors that may be 
the real cause of the instability. 
 
In the male sample, the idea that children have a stabilizing effect does 
not seem to apply in general. This opposes the theory of investments in 
commitment specific capital to some extent. There is a stabilizing effect 
of having very young children but the presence of children between ages 
four and ten has a destabilizing, instead of a stabilizing, effect. This may 
be due to the relatively young mean age of spouses in the male sample. 
To be able to have a child over the age of four, the average female part-
ner had to be very young when the child was born, which may, in itself, 
be destabilizing.  
 
5.2  The effect of unemployment on divorce, female sample 
In this subsection, the results from the model in equations (1) and (2) are 
given for the female sample. The GLS results from the unemployment 
equation are presented in Table 9, and the probit results from the separa-
tion equation are displayed in Table 10.  
 
The results of the unemployment equation in Table 9 show that, as for 
the male sample, female unemployment is negatively related to age. 
When it comes to schooling, the number of days in unemployment in-
creases with upper secondary school compared to compulsory school, 
but there is a large negative effect of university studies. A woman living 
in a city or in a labour market region characterized by a high employ-
ment growth rate on average experiences shorter spells of unemploy-
ment than other women. Women born abroad are unemployed for longer 
periods. The number of days in unemployment is decreasing with the 
earnings of both parents.  
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Individual-Specific Characteristics   
  Age  -9.05***         
 (0.16) 
  Born Abroad  17.15***        
(1.93) 
  Upper Secondary School  2.80**       
 (1.38) 
  University  -25.82***       
 (1.72) 
  Compulsory School GPA  -18.60***        
(0.75) 
  GPA Missing  -54.41***        
(3.57) 
  Living in City  -36.13***      
 (0.91) 
  Regional Employment Growth Rate  -0.85***        
(0.22) 
Parental Characteristics   
  Mother Earnings  -6.54***      
(0.70) 
  Father Earnings  -2.53***        
(0.39) 
  Constant  409.37***      
 (4.60) 
Model Information   
  LM test of no random effects    29510.92 
  R
2-adjusted 0.13 
Number of Observations  108 600 
 
Note: * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** Statistically significant at the 5 
percent level, *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
 
Table 10 below gives the probit results from the separation equation. 
Column 1 reports the result of a probit estimation for the separation 
equation with unemployment treated as exogenous. Once more there is 
no evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the separation equation, and 
according to the results in column 2, unemployment is found to be en-
dogenous and the two step procedure will be applied.  
 
Since females are not eligible for military service in Sweden, evaluation 
of non-cognitive traits can not be used as an instrument for unemploy-
ment. However, since the variable measuring the regional employment The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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growth rate and the born abroad variables exist for females, these will be 
used as instruments. Individual t-tests of the instruments show that each 
instrument significantly affects the number of days in unemployment. 
The F-test for determining the significance of the instruments in the un-
employment equation gives a value of 75 with two degrees of freedom, 
which is again well above the critical value for any level of significance. 
The likelihood ratio test between the log-likelihood of the model in col-
umn 3 and the likelihood of its counterpart, where the instruments are 
substituted for the predicted number of unemployment days, shows that 
there is no significant difference between the two log likelihoods, since 
the value is 0.16 with one degree of freedom. The critical value for sig-
nificance at the 90 percent level is 2.71. The t-tests of the coefficients 
for the instruments when they are included in the model of column 3 are 
not significant. Therefore, the following discussion will be based on the 
results in column 3. The marginal effects for the variables can be found 
in Table B2 of Appendix B. 
 
The coefficient for the predicted number of days in unemployment in 
column 3 of Table 10 shows that the effect of number of days in unem-
ployment on divorce is negative for the female sample. This is some-
what surprising, but shows that the effect of unemployment on divorce 
is indeed overestimated when the endogeneity of unemployment is not 
accounted for. From Table B1 of Appendix B, it can be seen that the 
marginal effect of one additional unemployment day is -0.001, to be 
compared with the general separation probability in the female sample 
of 0.048.  
 
The negative effect of female unemployment on divorce could be a sign 
that when females are unemployed, the non-market work is taken care of 
and the relationship becomes more stable. Therefore, the division of la-
bour in Sweden may not be as non-traditional after all. Naturally, the ef-
fect could also be the result of a deliberate choice of the couple regar-
ding the division of labour. Another likely explanation is that women are 
often the initiating party in the divorce decision, which has been found 
by, for example, Sayer et al. (2005), and a woman who is unemployed 
will probably be less likely to initiate a divorce since the value of her 
outside alternative will be lower than when she was employed. 
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Table 10. Probit Results for Separation Equation, Females 
 
  Column 









Individual-Specific Characteristics     
  Predicted Unemployment Days      -0.007***  
(0.002) 
  Unemployment Days  0.0002***  
(0.0001) 
-0.007***  
(0.002)   
  Estimated Error from    
  Unemployment Equation    0.007***  
(0.002)   






  Upper Secondary School  -0.14***   
(0.02) 
-0.12***   
(0.02) 
-0.12***   
(0.02) 
  University  -0.28***   
(0.03) 
-0.46***   
(0.05) 
-0.46***   
(0.05) 
  Compulsory School GPA  -0.10***   
(0.01) 
-0.23***   
(0.03) 
-0.23***   
(0.03) 
  GPA missing  -0.34***   
(0.05) 
-0.66***       
(0.10) 
-0.67***       
(0.10) 






Partner Characteristics     




























0.04**   
(0.02) 
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Table 10. Continued 
 
Parental Characteristics     
  Mother Earnings  0.03***  
(0.01) 
-0.02   
(0.02) 
-0.02   
(0.02) 






Couple Characteristics     
  Different Ethnicity  0.20***   
(0.03) 
0.22***   
(0.03) 
0.22***   
(0.03) 
  Living in City  0.08***  
(0.01) 
-0.16*** 
  (0.06) 
-0.16***    
(0.06) 
  Social Assistance Recipients  0.39***   
(0.02) 
0.40***   
(0.02) 
0.40***   
(0.02) 
















0.03   
(0.02) 
  Children 11-15 Years   0.14**   
(0.06) 
0.14**   
(0.06) 
0.14**   
(0.06) 
  Children 16-17 Years   -0.05      
(0.17) 
-0.05      
(0.17) 
-0.05      
(0.17) 
  Constant  -0.63***   
(0.09) 
2.20***       
(0.69) 
2.24***       
(0.69) 
Model Information     
  Log likelihood  -19736.73  -19727.36  -19732.29 






  Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.06 
Number of Observations  108 600  108 600  108 600 
 
Note: The standard errors of columns 2 and 3 have been Murphy and Topel corrected for 
the inclusion of predicted values of unemployment days and the predicted error term, re-
spectively. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering.* Statistically significant at the 
10 percent level, ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, *** Statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level 
   
For females, there is both a direct and a negative effect of age on the 
probability of separation, but the indirect effect through unemployment 
is now destabilizing and the probability of separation is once more in-
creasing with age difference between partners. The direct effect of 
schooling decreases the probability of separation, but the probability is 
increasing if the male spouse has a lower education, the latter being the 
opposite of the result found for males. Being committed to a partner The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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born abroad is again stabilizing. As for the male sample, being of differ-
ent ethnicities has a destabilizing effect on the relationship.  
 
Living in a city has a negative direct effect on the probability of dissolu-
tion for females. This could be interpreted in terms of the marriage mar-
ket. According to Edlund (2005), women, in fertile ages, outnumber 
men in urban areas. She suggests that the reason may be linked to higher 
male incomes in urban areas, and that women migrate to urban areas in 
order to achieve better matches. This means that, ceteris paribus, fe-
males in cities are less likely to divorce. Receiving social assistance is 
once more negative for stability, but having a high earning father is sta-
bilizing. As was the case for the male sample, the presence of very 
young children is stabilizing for the relationship whereas the effect of 
having older children works the other way around. 
 
6  Conclusions  
 
This study focuses on unemployment and its effects on the probability of 
separation. Unemployment is often included as a control variable in the 
economic divorce literature, but research more explicitly focusing on the 
role of unemployment in the divorce decision has so far been limited. 
This paper takes the investigation of the role played by unemployment 
in the dissolution of relationships further than has previously been done. 
By applying a two step estimation method to an extensive data set, un-
employment is recognized as endogenous in the separation decision. In 
the few studies that actually do focus on unemployment and divorce, lit-
tle attention has been given to the role of female unemployment. Besides 
finding unemployment to be endogenous, this study sheds some new 
light on the role of female unemployment by separately studying two 
samples of individuals, one female sample and one male sample, while 
controlling for the characteristics of their respective partners. 
 
The findings are that for males, the probability of separation is increas-
ing with the number of unemployment days, and that the effect is under-
estimated when unemployment is treated as exogenous. For females, 
treating unemployment as exogenous in the separation equation instead 
overestimates the role played by unemployment. For females, the sepa-
ration probability is found to be decreasing with unemployment, which 
differs from findings in previous studies. One explanation could be that 
the division of labour in Sweden may not be as non-traditional and that 
unemployment eases the double burden of paid and unpaid work for fe-
males. Since females have in previous studies been found to be those of-
ten initiating a separation, another possible explanation is that a woman 




As indicated by the results of this study, there is more to unemployment 
and its role in the separation decision than has previously been known, 
especially when it comes to female unemployment. Therefore, more re-
search is called for. For example, if data were available, it would be in-
teresting to do the same type of analysis as is done here for both spouses 
in a couple.  The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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 Appendix A 
 
Table A1. Variable Definitions and Explanations 
 
Variable Name  Explanation 
Individual-Specific Characteristics   
  Age at Start of Commitment  
The age of the individual at the start of the com-
mitment, the individual’s age in every year will be 
used in estimations.  
  Earnings 
The individual’s gross income expressed in hun-
dreds of thousand. Includes both labour and non 
labour income.  
  Days in Unemployment   The number of days in unemployment in a given 
year. 
  Compulsory School 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
that the individual has completed in a given year is 
nine years of compulsory school, used as a refer-
ence case. 
  Upper Secondary School 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
that the individual has completed in a given year is 
2-4 years of upper secondary school. 
  University 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
that the individual has completed in a given year is 
more than upper secondary school education. 
  GPA Compulsory School  Grade point average from the final year of compul-
sory school, scale 1-5. 
  Sweden  Takes the value 1 if the individual was born in 
Sweden, used as a reference case. 
  Born Abroad  Takes the value 1 if the individual was born 
outside of Sweden. 
  Evaluation of Non-Cognitive  
  Traits  Psychological evaluation, males only, scale 1-9. 
  Test of Cognitive Traits  Practical and theoretical tests, males only, scale 1-
9. 
Parental Characteristics   
  Parental Earnings 
The mean gross income over the years 1990-1992 
expressed in hundreds of thousand. Includes both 
labour and non labour income.  
  Parent Compulsory School 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
completed in 1992 is nine years of compulsory 
school. 
  Parent Upper Secondary School 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
completed in 1992 is 2-4 years of upper secondary 
school. 
  Parent University 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
completed in 1992 is more than upper secondary 
school. 
  Parent Sweden  Takes the value 1 if the mother or father respect-
ively was born in Sweden, used as reference case. The Role of Unemployment in the Commitment Dissolution… 
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Table A1. Continued 
 
  Parent Born Abroad  Takes the value 1 if the mother or father respect-
ively was born outside of Sweden. 
Partner Characteristics   
  Age at Start of Commitment  
The age of the partner at the start of the commit-
ment, partner age in every year will be used in the 
estimations. In order to account for different 
effects depending on who is older, partner age will 
be divided into two separate variables, measuring 
whether the male or the female is older in the 
estimations. 
  Partner’s Earnings 
The partner’s gross income expressed in hundreds 
of thousand. Includes both labour and non labour 
income.  
  Compulsory School 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
that the partner has completed in a given year is 
nine years of compulsory school, used as reference 
case. 
  Upper Secondary School 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
that the partner has completed in a given year is 2-
4 years of upper secondary school. 
  University 
Takes the value 1 if the highest level of schooling 
that the partner has completed in a given year is 
more than upper secondary school education. 
  Sweden  Takes the value 1 if the partner was born in Swe-
den, used as a reference case. 
  Born Abroad  Takes the value 1 if the partner was born outside of 
Sweden. 
Couple Characteristics   
  Duration of Commitment   Describes how long the commitment has lasted, 
cannot be used with age in the estimations. 
  Number of Children 
Measures how many children a couple has in a 
given year, will be divided into age intervals in the 
estimations. 
  Living in City  Takes the value 1 if the couple lives in one of the 
three larger cities of Sweden in a given year. 
  Social Assistance Recipients  Takes the value 1 if the couple received social 
assistance in a given year. 
  Different Ethnicity 
Takes the value 1 if the spouses are of different 
ethnicities, this variable is on a finer scale than the 
“born abroad” variables. 
  Different level of education 
Takes the value 1 if the spouses have different 
levels of education in a given year. In the estima-
tions, this will be divided into two separate vari-
ables, measuring whether the male or the female 
has a higher degree of education, in order to 
account for different effects depending on who is 
more educated. 
  Regional Employment Growth   
  Rate 
Measures the change in employment growth rate in 





Table B1. Marginal Effects, Separation Equation, Males and Females. 
 
  Males  Females 
Variable Name  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects 
Individual-Specific Characteristics    
  Predicted Unemployment Days  0.0002**  -0.001***   
  Age  0.01    -0.01***   
  Upper Secondary School  -0.01**  -0.01***   
  University  -0.02***  -0.03***   
  Compulsory School GPA  -0.01***  -0.02***   
  GPA missing  -0.02***  -0.03***   
  Earnings  -0.005***  -0.04**   
Partner Characteristics    
  Older (in years)  0.008*  0.001***   
  Younger (in years)  0.004***  0.01***   
  Born Abroad  -0.01***    -0.01**   
  More Educated  -0.007***  -0.004**   
  Less Educated  0.008***  0.003**   
  Earnings  -0.001  -0.01***   
Parental Characteristics    
  Mother Earnings  0.004***  -0.001   
  Father Earnings  -0.004***  -0.01***   
Couple Characteristics    
  Different Ethnicity  0.02***  0.02***   
  Living in City  0.01***   -0.01***   
  Social Assistance Recipients  0.05***    0.05***   
  Children ≤ 3 Years   -0.002*  -0.01***   
  Children 4-6 Years   0.01***   0.01***   
  Children 7-10 Years   0.01***  0.003   
  Children 11-15 Years   -0.001  0.01**   
  Children 16-17 Years   0.01  -0.004   
  Constant  -0.12***     0.19***        
Model Information    
  Log likelihood  -12326.45  -19732.29 




  Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.06 
Number of Observations  65 125  108 600 
 
Note: Marginal effects are computed at the means of the variables, marginal effects for 
dummy variables are  0 P 1 P − . * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** Sta-
tistically significant at the 5 percent level, *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent 
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